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A framework is described for understanding the schizophrenic syndrome at the brain
systems level. It is hypothesized that over-activation of dynamic gesture and social
perceptual processes in the temporal-parietal occipital junction (TPJ), posterior superior
temporal sulcus (PSTS) and surrounding regions produce the syndrome (including
positive and negative symptoms, their prevalence, prodromal signs, and cognitive
deficits). Hippocampal system hyper-activity and atrophy have been consistently found
in schizophrenia. Hippocampal activity is highly correlated with activity in the TPJ and may
be a source of over-excitation of the TPJ and surrounding regions. Strong evidence for
this comes from in-vivo recordings in humans during psychotic episodes. Many positive
symptoms of schizophrenia can be reframed as the erroneous sense of a presence
or other who is observing, acting, speaking, or controlling; these qualia are similar to
those evoked during abnormal activation of the TPJ. The TPJ and PSTS play a key
role in the perception (and production) of dynamic social, emotional, and attentional
gestures for the self and others (e.g., body/face/eye gestures, audiovisual speech and
prosody, and social attentional gestures such as eye gaze). The single cell representation
of dynamic gestures is multimodal (auditory, visual, tactile), matching the predominant
hallucinatory categories in schizophrenia. Inherent in the single cell perceptual signal of
dynamic gesture representations is a computation of intention, agency, and anticipation
or expectancy (for the self and others). Stimulation of the TPJ resulting in activation of
the self representation has been shown to result a feeling of a presence or multiple
presences (due to heautoscopy) and also bizarre tactile experiences. Neurons in the TPJ
are also tuned, or biased to detect threat related emotions. Abnormal over-activation in this
system could produce the conscious hallucination of a voice (audiovisual speech), a person
or a touch. Over-activation could interfere with attentional/emotional gesture perception
and production (negative symptoms). It could produce the unconscious feeling of being
watched, followed, or of a social situation unfolding along with accompanying abnormal
perception of intent and agency (delusions). Abnormal activity in the TPJ would also be
predicted to create several cognitive disturbances that are characteristic of schizophrenia,
including abnormalities in attention, predictive social processing, working memory, and a
bias to erroneously perceive threat.
Keywords: hippocampus, schizophrenia, parietal, biological motion, superior temporal sulcus, intraparietal sulcus,
autism, social cognition
OVERVIEW
A framework will be presented to account for the positive symp-
toms (hallucinations, delusions) negative symptoms (e.g., affec-
tive unresponsiveness), prodromal signs, and cognitive deficits of
schizophrenia. It is posited that the phenomenological aspects
of the syndrome stem from the over-activation of the same or
adjacent neural elements within the temporal-parietal occipital
junction (TPJ), the posterior superior temporal sulcus (PSTS)
and surrounding cortical regions. Activity in the TPJ is coupled
with hippocampal activity, a region that has been consistently
implicated in schizophrenia. Hence over-activation may stem
from abnormal activity in the hippocampal formation, an area
that is prone to excitotoxic activity. Abnormal activity in these
regions would also lead to abnormal activity in efferent frontal
lobe regions (these regions are shown in the figures throughout
the paper). The framework accounts for several recent findings;
volume reductions in schizophrenia have been most frequently
found in the hippocampus and the posterior superior (and lat-
eral) temporal regions, including recent single site and multisite
studies using large numbers of subjects (Seidman et al., 2003;
Honea et al., 2005, 2008; Segall et al., 2009). Over-activation has
been found in these regions in schizophrenia and this abnor-
mal activation has been shown to be related to symptoms and
cognitive deficits (e.g., Lennox et al., 1999; Han et al., 2007;
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Wible et al., 2009a; Hashimoto et al., 2010). I claim that the
pattern or relative prevalence of the symptoms and cognitive
deficits are a result of the representational structure at the sin-
gle cell level and the neural architecture (the adjacency and
overlap of function) within the TPJ and particularly the PSTS.
Note that the PSTS functional region spans a large area and
may extend into superior temporal gyrus as well as into middle
and inferior temporal gyri. Regions designated in the litera-
ture as TPJ or PSTS often refer to overlapping areas, and the
extent of these regions varies between investigations; for this rea-
son, these terms are used loosely to refer to this general region.
Evidence from human brain stimulation (both intracranial stim-
ulation and TMS), lesion studies, single unit, and functional
imaging studies in monkeys and humans show that these regions
act as a coordinated system and may form part of a core neu-
ral substrate for dynamic social perception and interaction as
well as self representation (e.g., Seltzer and Pandya, 1978, 1994;
Lewis and van Essen, 2000; Padberg et al., 2003; Decety and
Grezes, 2006; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Hein and Knight, 2008;
Redcay, 2008; Wible et al., 2009b; Redcay et al., 2010). In fact
a recent study confirmed that TPJ activity was uniquely active
during naturalistic live interaction with another person (and
joint social attention) when compared to control conditions—see
Figure 1 from Redcay et al. (2010). Recently published infor-
mation from several subfields of cognitive neuroscience is used
to reframe the symptoms and qualia that comprise schizophre-
nia. The functional descriptions of TPJ/PSTS neural systems are
laid out in separate sections of the manuscript, but the sepa-
ration is somewhat arbitrary and used for simplification as the
functionality is extensively overlapping. In each section, symp-
toms and cognitive deficits are described that are proposed to
be maximally related to the functions described in those para-
graphs.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA
First the phenomenological aspects of the schizophrenic syn-
drome will briefly described in order to establish what the
framework is attempting to explain; some of this information
is from a large neuroimaging and clinical dataset from the
Functional Biomedical Informatics Network Consortium (Wible
FIGURE 1 | From Redcay et al. (2010) top panel; regions responding
more to live interaction with a person than a recorded interaction
(note activity is bilateral). Reprinted Figure 2, top panel from Redcay et al.
(2010), Copyright (2010) used with permission from Elsevier.
et al., 2009a; Wible and Molina, in preparation). Schizophrenia is
characterized by hallucinations and delusions, as well as deficits in
attention and working memory. Social cognition is also affected,
as well as affective responsiveness. Individuals can present with
asociality, a paucity or lack of facial movement, eye contact,
vocal inflection, and facial expression. Anhedonia and apathy are
sometimes present; impersistence at work and school is also a
frequent sign. However, there is evidence that the experience of
emotion is not as affected as emotional responsiveness (Kring
et al., 1993; Myin-Germeys et al., 2000; Kring and Moran, 2008).
Auditory hallucinations of voices are common; approximately
74% of patients hear voices (Silbersweig and Stern, 1996) and
also feel that someone is speaking to them or that there are
people talking and present who cannot be seen. Visual halluci-
nations are present in approximately 56% of patients and are
most often in the form of human figures showing movement
(70%; Gauntlett-Gilbert and Kuipers, 2003). Somatic hallucina-
tions constitute the next largest category of hallucinations and
can consist of burning or tingling feelings as well as a percep-
tion that the body has changed in shape or size. Somatic delusions
also occur and may consist of a perception that the body or face is
changed or unusual in some way. A small percentage of patients
have olfactory hallucinations. Persecutory delusions often involve
the belief that one is being followed, spied upon or harassed by
others; some individuals experience delusions of jealousy. This
feeling of the presence of another may also be manifested in delu-
sions of reference. Individuals with delusions of reference can
feel that others are communicating with them via gestures or
secretly observing them (Startup and Startup, 2005). Delusions
of control are experienced as a belief that one’s feelings or actions
are controlled by someone else. This misattribution of agency
can also occur for thoughts. Some patients feel as though peo-
ple can hear their thoughts (thought broadcasting), that their
thoughts have been taken (thought withdrawal) or that they can
read other’s thoughts (mind reading). With delusions of guilt,
patients may feel responsible for some terrible act(s). Some also
have grandiose and religious delusions. Disturbances in language
are also found in some individuals; these symptoms are grouped
under the category of thought disorder and involve loose asso-
ciations or derailment, tangentiality, and incoherence. Thought
disorder symptoms fit into our framework also, but will not
be discussed as extensively here as other symptoms (the lan-
guage domain in will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent
manuscript). Patients can also present with decreased, slowed or
bizarre motor, and speech responding. For a detailed and com-
plete list of symptoms, see the Scale for the Assessment of Positive
Symptoms or SAPS and the Scale for the Assessment of Negative
Symptoms or SANS (Andreasen, 1981, 1984). Frequently cited
or core cognitive deficits are those of working memory and ver-
bal declarative memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Kuperberg and
Heckers, 2000; Seidman et al., 2003) as well as attention (Elvevag
and Goldberg, 2000). Several investigators have also identified
cognitive aspects that seem to be abnormal in schizophrenia, and
these will be addressed in our review (e.g., abnormal salience
detection, abnormal efference feedback, and abnormal error-
dependant updating of inferences—see Kapur, 2003; Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Whitford et al., 2012).
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEORETICAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE SYNDROME: REFRAMING THE
SYMPTOMS AND COGNITIVE DEFICITS OF
SCHIZOPHRENIA
The seemingly diverse cognitive deficits and symptoms described
above have led investigators to posit either abnormalities in
higher level executive function involving the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC); or to posit widespread abnormalities
in gamma, cognitive dysmetria or cortical inefficiencies (e.g.,
Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Andreasen, 1999; Kapur, 2003; Heinks-
Maldonado et al., 2007; Tseng et al., 2007; Fletcher and Frith,
2009; Powell et al., 2012). For example, one class of theories
posits problems with corollary discharge (from DLPFC to audi-
tory cortex for example) and a failure to ignore stimuli because
they are not tagged as self-generated—so actions and thoughts
are judged to be arising from someone else and they are more
salient (Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2007; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
A second problem with probabilistic reasoning and belief forma-
tion (based on frontal lobe) is then postulated to account for
delusions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). A schizophrenic deficit in
anterior cingulate and error detection or cognitive control (as in
the Stroop task) and then a failure to engage the DLPFC to resolve
the conflict has also been proposed (Carter and van Veen, 2007).
These theories do not directly address negative symptom for-
mation and may not be able to account for some positive symp-
toms such as visual hallucinations or hearing voices conversing
with each other.
Ultimately any account of schizophrenia must address key
components of the disease including the prodromal signs, the
particular form or content of the symptoms (e.g., that visual hal-
lucinations consist of humanoid forms), the relative prevalence
of symptoms, the cognitive deficits, and the onset in late ado-
lescence. Although many current theories postulate widespread
brain abnormalities, the syndrome of schizophrenia is distinct
from other neurological conditions (e.g., Parkinson’s disease) and
the patients present with a specific cluster of symptoms and
prodromal perceptual disturbances.
As described above, most current theories are based on the
implicit assumption that the functions affected in schizophrenia
are disparate and diverse. Widespread abnormalities or multiple
sites of dysfunction may be at the core of the disease. However,
in the current framework, the symptoms, and cognitive deficits
are seen as different aspects or consequences of the same dysfunc-
tion within a core system. The syndrome can be reconceptualized
as the aberrant functioning of a system that is used for social
communication and I will describe how this then provides a
unified explanation of the symptoms and cognitive deficits. The
overlap of function in this system reflects the overlap of func-
tions that are used during social communication. For example,
audiovisual speech and visual-tactile gestures occur simultane-
ously during social communication and are both represented
in either an overlapping or adjacent way in this system. The
core abnormality underlying hallucinations, delusions, negative
symptoms, and cognitive deficits is proposed to stem from over-
activation in a circumscribed posterior region (PSTS/TPJ) in
either the same or adjacent neurons or circuits. Evidence will
be described showing that the syndrome arises from this system.
The framework described here also provides a link between pro-
posed molecular/neurotransmitter/genetic abnormalities found
in schizophrenia and the phenomenology which arises from
properties at the brain systems level of analysis. Abnormalities
in N-Methyl-D-Aspartate receptor function (NMDA), gamma-
aminobutyric acid (GABA), or the interaction of the two have
been proposed to underlie the syndrome (Lewis et al., 2005;
Coyle, 2006; Rujescu et al., 2006; Javitt, 2009; Woo et al., 2010).
These abnormalities may differentially affect the hippocampal
system and possibly the magnocellular processing streams (dis-
cussed below).
HIPPOCAMPAL INVOLVEMENT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
There is overwhelming converging evidence for the involvement
of the hippocampus in schizophrenia (e.g., Bogerts et al., 1985;
Brown et al., 1986; Manchanda et al., 1993; Heckers et al.,
1998; Heckers, 2001; Seidman et al., 2003; Ghose et al., 2009;
Heckers andKonradi, 2010;Williams et al., 2010). The hippocam-
pus undergoes changes in adolescence (frequently the onset of
schizophrenia) and has unique qualities related to sex hormones
as well as stress hormones. It is hypothesized that aberrant activ-
ity from the hippocampal system produces psychotic symptoms.
In the field of neurology, there is an extensive literature show-
ing that patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (with the focus in
the hippocampus) can sometimes develop psychosis (reviewed in
Devinsky, 2008). The following quote from Elliott et al. (2009)
alludes to this association between hippocampal activity and
psychotic symptoms: “Postictal psychosis is noted for its simi-
larity to schizophrenia-like/paranoid and affective psychoses and
there is convincing SEEG evidence that, for some cases at least,
the psychosis is not in fact postictal but rather an ictal psy-
chosis due to ongoing limbic seizure activity and a form of
non-convulsive status epilepticus. . . . There is convincing SEEG
evidence of frequent, semi-continuous and sometimes continu-
ous epileptic activity in limbic structures at the time of psychotic
and hallucinatory ideation and behavior, suggesting that in some
cases at least, the epileptic activity is the cause of the symptoms.”
Note that the hippocampal system is the most frequent site of
epilepsy.
NMDA and/or NMDA/GABA abnormalities have been pro-
posed to play a key role in schizophrenia, and drugs that act on
NMDA receptors such as phencyclidine or PCP mimic the symp-
toms. These drugs seem to exert a differentially large effect within
the hippocampus (Olney and Farber, 1995; Coyle, 1996, 2006;
Bogerts, 1997; Benes, 1999; Olney et al., 1999; Tamminga et al.,
2003; Benes et al., 2007; Javitt, 2009; Woo et al., 2010).
A recent high resolution study measuring cerebral blood vol-
ume in prodromal individuals showed that CA1/subiculum (the
input/output layers of the hippocampus) hyperactivity uniquely
predicted conversion to psychosis and that this activity was corre-
lated with clinical symptoms (Schobel et al., 2009). Conversion to
psychosis was not predicted by activity in the other regions mea-
sured such as amygdala, DLPFC, basal ganglia, gyrus rectus, or
medial orbitofrontal cortex. Importantly, analyses on this human
dataset and studies using mice confirmed that medication did not
mediate this effect. The subiculumundergoes a “striking” increase
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in myelination during late adolescence corresponding to the onset
of schizophrenia; the changes during adolescence were far greater
than in other brain regions that were examined, including the
anterior and posterior cingulate cortices (Benes, 1989). In this
report, it was also noted that the myelination of the prefrontal
cortex did not undergo a striking change in adolescence. This
increase in myelination in the output layers of the hippocampus
could increase the likelihood of aberrant hippocampal activity
affecting other areas such as the TPJ (note that the inferior pari-
etal region also undergoes myelination in adolescence—this is
discussed below).
The CA1 layer of the hippocampus is differentially sensitive to
excitotoxic damage relative to other brain areas. Anoxic/ischemic
episodes can cause circumscribed damage to only the CA1 region
in adults resulting in an amnesic syndrome (Zola-Morgan et al.,
1986). The CA1 layer has the highest concentration of NMDA
receptors and glucocorticoid or stress hormone receptors in the
brain, conferring high levels of plasticity (e.g., long term poten-
tiation or LTP) and also vulnerability to excitotoxic mechanisms
(Cotman, 1987; Sapolsky, 1994; reviewed in Wible et al., 1997).
LTP increases the likelihood of an action potential at a synapse
and hence increases excitability. PCP blocks NMDA receptors
but paradoxically acts to excite neurons. PCP may achieve this
effect by blocking recurrent inhibitory pathways more strongly
than the main excitatory pathways, leading to the disinhibition
of pyramidal neurons and resulting in excitation (Grunze et al.,
1996). The symptoms of PCP intoxication are similar to both the
positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Javitt, 2007).
CA1 may also be relatively prone to excitation due to abnormali-
ties in GABA interneurons, which are 10 times more sensitive to
NMDA receptor inhibitors than pyramidal neurons, and which
exert an inhibitory tone on neural activity (Grunze et al., 1996).
GABA abnormalities have been found in the hippocampus in
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (e.g., Heckers et al., 2002).
The hippocampus also contains high concentrations of N-acetyl-
aspartyl glutamate (NAAG), which is released with glutamate and
selectively blocks LTP of recurrent inhibition that is mediated by
NMDA receptors on GABA interneurons (Coyle, 2006). Increased
levels of NAAG in schizophrenic brains might also be responsible
for use-dependent excitotoxic damage or oxidative stress damage,
and the behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia (Coyle, 2006).
Schizophrenia (as well as autism) may be more prevalent,
have an earlier onset and a more severe course in males than in
females (e.g., Nicole et al., 1992). The hippocampus is one of
the most sexually dimorphic regions in the brain and this fea-
ture could result in differential vulnerability to psychosis inmales.
Testosterone has been shown to affect memory and testosterone
and estradiol levels in the hippocampus may be regulated inde-
pendently of levels in the body (Schulz and Korz, 2010). Sex
hormones may regulate neurogenesis in the hippocampus (Gould
et al., 2000). Stress hormones may also interact with testosterone
function (Ward, 1984;Ward and Reed, 1985). Hippocampal phys-
iology is tied to the action of some schizophrenia associated genes
such as DISC1 and ZNF804A (Meyer and Morris, 2009; Lencz
et al., 2010; Ayhan et al., 2011). In summary, the hippocampal
system is relatively vulnerable to excitotoxic damage and to psy-
chological stress, themajor output pathways undergomyelination
in adolescence (when schizophrenic symptoms appear) and the
hippocampus is especially sensitive to hormonal influences that
are changing during adolescence. Thus, hippocampal dysfunction
may provide a touchstone for understanding how a diverse set
of genetic and developmental factors could produce schizophre-
nia. Hippocampal over-activation has been known to exist and
has been replicated for a number of years; what is missing is
an understanding of the consequences of such over-activation.
Schizophrenia may result from an interaction between environ-
mental factors and a genetic predisposition that is present from
birth. Over-activation of the hippocampal system could stimu-
late other brain regions resulting eventually in excitotoxic damage
both to the hippocampus and to regions whose activity is highly
correlated with hippocampal activity.
HIPPOCAMPAL ACTIVITY IS CORRELATED WITH
ACTIVITY IN THE TEMPORAL-PARIETAL JUNCTION
Resting state hippocampal connectivity is highly correlated with
TPJ activity and hence over-activation of the hippocampus
should be coincident with over-activation of the TPJ; regions
showing high connectivity with hippocampal activity are shown
in Figure 2 from Vincent et al. (2006); see also Kahn et al.
(2008). Consistent with these connectivity findings, the poste-
rior superior temporal and inferior parietal regions are efferent
targets of the hippocampus (Rockland and van Hoesen, 1999;
Clower et al., 2001). Hippocampal amnesia affects social func-
tioning and was found to disrupt the creative use of language
during social interaction (Duff et al., 2009). NMDA abnormali-
ties might be expected to exert a relatively large influence on this
region both through its high connectivity with the hippocam-
pus and its putative involvement in magnocellular processing (see
below). It is proposed that the regions showing high connec-
tivity with the hippocampus are involved in psychiatric disease
and that TPJ—hippocampal interaction may produce the pre-
ponderance of schizophrenic symptoms and cognitive deficits.
Note that others have shown abnormal activity in schizophre-
nia in portions of the brain showing high connectivity with the
hippocampus (e.g., Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009). These abnor-
malities may be fully manifested when myelination and exposure
to hormones converge in adolescence. There is indirect evidence
for hippocampal—TPJ abnormal connectivity in the form of
overactive default mode findings in schizophrenia (e.g., Garrity
et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; Zhou et al., 2007). In a resting
state analysis, a seed placed in the hippocampus will reveal activity
in many of the major neocortical regions constituting the default
network (Vincent et al., 2006). However, direct investigations of
this “hippocampal network” have not yet been performed.
THE REPRESENTATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ARCHITECTURE
OF THE TPJ REGION MATCHES ESSENTIAL ASPECTS
OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME: AN OVERVIEW
AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE LOGIC AND
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE FRAMEWORK
The representational structure and functional architecture of the
TPJ will be reviewed to reveal how it is related to the diverse
symptoms of schizophrenia. Functional regions have been iden-
tified which play a core role in dynamic social communication
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 180 | 4
Wible Framework for understanding schizophrenia
FIGURE 2 | From Vincent et al. (2006); regions correlated with
hippocampal activity in resting state (note that activity is bilateral).
These regions overlap with those showing activity related to recollective
success. Figure 8 from the paper Vincent et al. (2006). Disclaimer: this is an
unofficial adaptation or translation of an article that appeared in a publication
of the American Physiological Society. The American Physiological Society
has not endorsed the content of this adaptation or translation, or the context
of its use.
and interaction. Recent evidence shows that in humans these
representational systems are housed to a large extent within
the TPJ/PSTS territory and are used in dynamic gesture per-
ception and production (including audiovisual speech), agency
perception, theory of mind, bottom up attention, social attention,
and emotional perception/reaction (see Blanke and Arzy, 2005;
Decety and Grezes, 2006; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Redcay, 2008;
Wible et al., 2009b; Wible, 2012). For example, Redcay (2008)
reviews the function of the PSTS as follows: “Thus, behaviors that
engage the STS include attributing intentions to others, percep-
tion of a social form from sparse, moving information, perception
of the changeable aspects of faces such as eye gaze and expressions,
complex motion perception, prosody perception, and narrative
comprehension, to name a few.” Figure 3 shows the overlap of
functional areas related to several of these functions (note that
most of these functional regions are bilateral; only the right
hemisphere is shown here).
The example of auditory hallucinations will be used illustrate
the logic for understanding the links between symptoms and
the brain that is used in the current framework. For the sake
of parsimony, I assume that auditory hallucinations or hearing
voices (the most prominent symptom) must activate at least some
of the same regions used to perceive voices. In the same way,
I posit that other symptoms must reflect activity within those
regions related to the content of the symptom. In non-psychotic
patients with visual hallucinations, the form of the hallucina-
tion matched the functional processing of the cortical regions
that were activated during the experience of the hallucination;
color hallucinations resulted from activation in color regions,
visual object hallucinations resulted from activation in regions
representing visual objects, etc. (Ffytche et al., 1998; Santhouse
et al., 2000). Therefore, it is proposed that schizophrenic symp-
toms are a result of over-activation or aberrant activation in those
regions whose processing and representational systems match
the experience of the delusion or hallucination. In other words,
FIGURE 3 | Summary figure of the overlap of functional regions in the
TPJ/PSTS involved in eyegaze (red); audiovisual speech (light blue);
self representation (yellow); theory of mind (green); emotional
perception of faces and prosody (dark blue). Rerepresentation of data
respectively from (Adolphs et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2003; Blanke and
Arzy, 2005; Nummenmaa et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010).
schizophrenic delusions and hallucinations stem from aberrant
perceptual experiences. The idiosyncratic presentation or form
of symptoms in patients is conceptualized as an attempt to make
sense of the bizarre perceptual experiences. Maher (1974) put for-
ward this hypothesis as illustrated by the following quotes “The
patient is delusional because he is actually experiencing percep-
tual input that demands an explanation.” “. . . the sensory quality
of the experiences differs in vividness and intensity from the kinds
of stimuli involved in normal misperception, and as the experi-
ences are likely to be prolonged over considerable periods of time
the machinery for reality-testing is itself impaired.”
As described above, the most prominent hallucinations are the
erroneous sense of a presence, voice or touch. The representation
of dynamic gestures in the TPJ region is multimodal in the
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auditory, visual, and tactile domains and over-activation of
these representations might underlie schizophrenic hallucina-
tions. Inherent in the representation of dynamic gesture and
person perception is the perception of agency and intention. So
the over-activation of these gesture representations would pro-
duce the (erroneous) perception of agency and intention. This
system for dynamic gesture processing is also used to perceive and
produce emotional and attentional gestures, for self representa-
tion and the feeling of being an agent, for understanding other’s
intentions and thoughts, for language and narrative comprehen-
sion, and for forming intentions to speak and act. These functions
might have counterparts respectively in the syndrome as deficits
in the perception and production of emotional and attentional
gestures (negative symptoms), problems with agency judgments
(e.g., delusions of control), social cognitive deficits, and disorders
of language (e.g., thought disorder, deficits in narrative compre-
hension). Hence, the prominent hallucinations and delusions of
schizophrenia can be categorized as a misperception of a social
presence as well as an accompanying misperception of inten-
tion and agency (e.g., someone is present, someone is speaking,
observing, communicating, spying, acting, touching, persecut-
ing, or controlling me). Several lines of evidence also show that
the feeling of a presence and problems with agency attribution,
as well as tactile hallucinations/delusions can also stem from a
disturbance of the self-representation (described below).
EVIDENCE FROM NEUROLOGY FOR TPJ AND HIPPOCAMPAL
INVOLVEMENT IN PRODUCING PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS
There are neurological conditions that result from frank brain
damage where individuals exhibit symptoms that are similar to
schizophrenia. Individuals with these syndromes can have delu-
sions, hallucinations and denial of illness (lack of insight). The
delusions can be fantastic and bizarre (as are those in schizophre-
nia). TPJ abnormalities are most often cited as the source of
these conditions, with temporal lobe epilepsy (hippocampus) also
sometimes present and thought to be a precipitating factor (e.g.,
Levine and Finklestein, 1982). Coltheart (2007) argues that delu-
sional beliefs stem from an abnormality in sensory or motor
function (as in inability to move a limb) plus damage to the right
hemisphere and in particular to the frontal lobe which contributes
the delusional aspects of the syndrome (Fletcher and Frith, 2009).
However, lesion data from human subjects contradicts this con-
clusion and shows that although frontal damage is evident in
some individuals with delusional syndromes, it is not necessary
to produce the syndrome (e.g., Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). A recent
review also posited that the inferior parietal region (part of the
TPJ) is involved in schizophrenia and extensive evidence is pre-
sented for this theory, much of which will not be reiterated here
(Torrey, 2007).
A circumscribed lesion of the TPJ or stimulation within this
region is sufficient to produce delusions and hallucinations; stim-
ulation of this region in humans can produce qualia such as
feelings of a shadowy presence, of flying or being outside the
body, of limb shortening/lengthening and hallucinations of com-
plex visual and auditory scenes involving people (to name a
few) (e.g., Peroutka et al., 1982; Blanke et al., 2002; Arzy et al.,
2006; reviewed in Wible et al., 2009b). Within the neurological
literature, damage to the right TPJ is often cited as the most
frequent site involved in producing delusional syndromes con-
cerning the body, with some patients showing symptoms that are
indistinguishable from schizophrenia. Cummings (1997) makes
the following observation: “Anatomically, lesions of the tem-
poroparietal region are associated with the highest frequency of
lesion-related psychoses (Levine and Finklestein, 1982; Peroutka
et al., 1982; Miller et al., 1986; Berthier and Starkstein, 1987;
Pakalnis et al., 1987; Rabins et al., 1991; Richardson et al., 1991).”
Correspondingly, right inferior parietal activity was related to
an active delusional state in a magneto encephalography (MEG)
study (Ishii et al., 2006). Two patients with temporal lobe epilepsy
were studied with MEG during a delusional state. Spikey activ-
ity in the right inferior parietal region was evident during the
delusional state and disappeared when the delusions resolved.
Geschwind (1965) describes the inferior parietal region as the
association cortex of association cortex and notes that it is “. . . one
of the last regions in which dendrites appear and that it matures
cytoarchitechtonically very late, often in late childhood.” This
developmental maturation corresponds well with the onset of
schizophrenic symptoms in late adolescence.
An overview of the dominant representational systems within
the TPJ will be presented to set the foundations for understand-
ing the relationship between sensory representation and higher
order perceptual categories such as self versus other processing,
agency, theory of mind, and social attention which have been
shown to play a key role in schizophrenia. Cellular properties will
also be described that correspond to aspects of the schizophrenic
syndrome that have been noted by investigators.
TPJ AND THE PERCEPTION OF OTHERS: MULTIMODAL
BIOLOGICAL MOTION, PERSON PERCEPTION AND
AUDIOVISUAL SPEECH PERCEPTION
Social cognitive deficits are considered to be “. . . one of the
primary determinants of functional outcome in schizophrenia.”
(quote from Javitt, 2009). Social perception has been defined as
“. . . the initial states of evaluating the social communicative inten-
tions of others by analysis of eye gaze direction, facial expressions,
body movements, and other types of biological motion.” (quote
from Allison et al., 2000). Low level embodied representations
(e.g., action-perception, somatosensory) may be used to make
high-level inferences and judgments about intentions, thoughts,
and desires of the self and others (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007;
Lombardo et al., 2010). Evidence for this comes from single cell
recording and neuroimaging data shows an intrinsic link between
dynamic gesture perception and the perception of agency, inten-
tion, and social anticipation or prediction. This representational
structure may be important for understanding schizophrenia.
Viewing biological motion in the form of gestures activates
much of the lateral occipital temporal cortex as well as the
PSTS, inferior parietal region, intraparietal sulcus, and supra-
marginal/precentral regions—see Figure 4 (Adolphs et al., 2000,
2002; Wheaton et al., 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2005; Nummenmaa
and Calder, 2009; Pinsk et al., 2009; Nummenmaa et al., 2010).
The PSTS, precentral gyrus and intraparietal sulcus are also acti-
vated during the imagination of biologicalmotion (see Blakemore
and Decety, 2001; Hein and Knight, 2008 for reviews). Lesions
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FIGURE 4 | From Pelphrey et al. (2005); Figure 3. fMRI activation related
to viewing dynamic gestures; figures show activation from the
condition showing the greatest response at each voxel (dark gray,
sulcal depth; white, gyral crown). Red—the greatest response to Eyes,
blue—Mouth, and green—Hand. Reprinted with permission from Pelphrey
et al. (2005). © The Author 2005.
of the lateral occipital temporal regions impair biological motion
recognition and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) to the PSTS impairs biological motion perception; hence,
these regions are core substrates for the perception of biological
motion in humans (Grossman et al., 2005; Billino et al., 2009).
The visual system may be organized into a ventral form pro-
cessing pathway and a dorsal or magnocellular pathway that
is specialized for processing movement and biological motion.
Biological motion activates the PSTS approximately 20ms before
information reaches the ventral stream (e.g., fusiform). In the
macaque, the dorsal pathway consists of V1,V3, medial tempo-
ral or MT, medial superior temporal or MST, which project then
to the posterior superior temporal polysensory area or STP (in
the monkey) and to parietal cortex (see Oram and Perrett, 1996).
Earlier categorizations of these systems as the “what and where”
visual streams may need to be reformulated; nonetheless the
streams do differ in their processing characteristics (Schneider,
1969; Jellema et al., 2004; Milner and Goodale, 2008). The
magnocellular visual pathway has been hypothesized to be dif-
ferentially affected in schizophrenia because of this pathway’s
susceptibility to NMDA abnormalities (Foxe et al., 2001; Butler
et al., 2005; Martinez et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Vohs et al.,
2008; Javitt, 2009).
Single unit recording and neuroimaging studies show activ-
ity related to form, motion and location within the STS in both
humans and monkeys (Baizer et al., 1991; Oram and Perrett,
1996; Decety and Grezes, 1999; Blakemore and Decety, 2001;
Karnath et al., 2001; Jellema et al., 2004). Puce and Perrett (2003)
provided an extensive review of single unit (cell) recording stud-
ies in monkey STS and synthesized the findings with those from
human subjects. The PSTS may be the human homolog of the
macaque area STP, which is also sometimes called area TPO
(Beauchamp et al., 2008). A population of cells in the macaque
anterior STP (STPa) with large receptive fields respond selec-
tively to the head and/or body independent of motion and also
display size constancy and position invariance. These invariances
may be used in higher order “person” identification. Cells have
also been described that encode facial identity and expression;
attributes that are also essential for representing persons and
social interaction (see Oram and Perrett, 1996). There are cells
in STPa that are selective for both form (seeing the body from a
particular view) and direction of motion (see Oram and Perrett,
1996; Barraclough et al., 2005 for reviews). Hence, visual person
(face/body) information is processed by “ventral stream” inferior
occipital and fusiform gyri as well as anterior temporal regions
which contribute biographical/person information (Gobbini and
Haxby, 2007). These streams intersect in the human PSTS where
visual motion, social/biographical, and speech domains come
together (Puce and Perrett, 2003; Gobbini and Haxby, 2007).
The representation of dynamic gesture information in these
areas is essentially multimodal (auditory, visual, and tactile); single
unit recording in the monkey showed that audiovisual represen-
tation was the most prominent followed by visual-tactile and then
trimodal response properties (e.g., Bruce et al., 1981). For exam-
ple, neurons in the STS have been shown to be active to both the
sight and sound of actions (Barraclough et al., 2005). The presen-
tation of congruent auditory and visual stimuli can augment the
single unit response by an average of 86% over visual stimulation
alone (Barraclough et al., 2005). In addition, the territory acti-
vated for audiovisual speech gestures in humans (the PSTS/lateral
temporal) occupies a significant portion of the PSTS (see approx-
imate area in light blue in Figure 3) and these regions respond
to both visual gestures and the speech sounds (e.g., Calvert and
Campbell, 2003; Wright et al., 2003); see also the figure in Table 1
inWible et al. (2009b). The predominance of voice hallucinations
and visions of people, followed by tactile hallucinations fits well
with this representational structure.
The integration of multimodal information within neurons
in this system is proposed to form a basis for understanding
action and may be used to anticipate and keep track of other’s
behavior without reference to the motor circuits that generate
the action (Beauchamp et al., 2004; Barraclough et al., 2005;
Beauchamp, 2005). Short term suppression is a phenomenon that
occurs in neurons through-out the brain. Single neurons in the
monkey STS exhibited a suppressed response to similar images for
a short time. The activity of these neurons was selective for cer-
tain sequences of dynamic action, but not others, and this activity
was dependant on the recent perceptual history. Hence, this activ-
ity dependant suppression results in “anticipatory” activity at
the single cell level where the cells are actually tuned to detect
inputs that are about to occur (Jellema and Perrett, 2003; Perrett
et al., 2009). This anticipation or prediction is automatically com-
puted without the need for motor simulation and is a natural
property of the cells used to perceive the action (Perrett et al.,
2009). These authors summarize the findings as follows: “We
conclude that in a changing perceptual world, the values repre-
sented by cells’ activities reflect a predicted future state rather
than the present reality.” Cellular activity that is tuned to “pre-
dict” could support the formation of expectations about other’s
impending behavior and may also be useful for keeping track of
action and gestures (Jellema and Perrett, 2003). One surprising
finding was that the responses of cells where an effective percep-
tual history was presented were also quite long (for some cells on
the order of 10 s). This sort of prolonged activation in response
to dynamic gestures would have important consequences if the
system were over-active as is proposed for schizophrenia. In addi-
tion to producing voice, visual person or tactile hallucinations,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 180 | 7
Wible Framework for understanding schizophrenia
aberrant activity in this system would be expected to interfere
with ongoing social/action perception and would affect the abil-
ity to track and understand gestures; it would also interfere with
judgments about expectation.
Puce and Perrett (2003) review evidence from single cell
recordings in the monkey STS showing that agency (intention,
purpose) is represented at the single cell level and is an inher-
ent part of the perceptual representation of dynamic gestures.
The STS contains cells that combine information about reach-
ing/grasping movements and about the attention or gaze direction
resulting in a cellular representation of the intentionality of move-
ments (Jellema et al., 2000). It was found that a few of these cells
also showed extended responses (for example, 7 s) that persisted
after the movement was finished.
The perception of agency and intention from biological
motion is also hypothesized to be one of the primary roles of
the PSTS in humans (Schultz et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2008).
Bilateral activation of the PSTS has been shown in several human
neuroimaging studies in response to viewing themotion of shapes
when the motion seems intentional (e.g., chasing) versus random
(e.g., Pelphrey et al., 2004; Saxe et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). In
one study, the (left) PSTS was the only region of those activated by
biological motion to respond differentially (increased activation)
to motion that was perceived to be caused by the actor when com-
pared to unintentional movement—caused by a piston moving
the hand up and down (Morris et al., 2008).
Hence, hallucinations of people (or voices) should also be
accompanied by the automatic attribution of intentions. This
result was obtained in a study of brain stimulation using a human
subject. Direct brain stimulation of the human TPJ caused the
feeling of a shadowy presence, which the authors attributed to
the stimulation of proprioceptive and tactile regions representing
the patient’s body (Arzy et al., 2006). This subject also attributed
intentions to the shadowy figure: “He wants to take the card”; “He
doesn’t want me to read.” Also note that stimulation of the lat-
eral occipital temporal, superior temporal and planum temporale
regions can produce visual hallucinations of action scenes involv-
ing people; these results illustrate that these regions may form the
neural substrate for human action representation, memory and
understanding (reviewed in Penfield and Perot, 1963; Wible et al.,
2009b).
Multimodal information from the PSTS is passed on (via infe-
rior parietal regions) to premotor regions. The parietal region
is generally thought to be involved in integrating sensory infor-
mation and transforming different coordinate systems into a
common frame of reference for action planning or forming inten-
tions for action (Andersen et al., 1997). The inferior parietal
and ventral premotor regions contain mirror representations that
are activated during either action observation or execution in
both monkeys and humans (Buccino et al., 2001; Fogassi et al.,
2005; Fujii et al., 2007). The posterior inferior and middle frontal
regions are also activated by visual gestures (Pelphrey et al., 2005).
The representation of these multimodal channels within a visuo-
spatial framework and the coordination of different frameworks
may also be important components of these representational
systems; these properties may also be related to schizophrenic
symptoms (see discussion in later sections).
The relative proportions of visual and auditory and touch
responsive neurons in the PSTS region matches well with the
proportion of hallucinations in the various modalities observed
in schizophrenia. Auditory hallucinations (voices) were the most
prominent, followed by visual hallucinations of humanoid fig-
ures. Tactile hallucinations are less prominent and olfactory hal-
lucinations are even rarer. There are olfactory receptive areas
within the IPS and TPJ, but these are relatively less prominent
(Swisher et al., 2007). The realization that the perception of
dynamic gestures is multimodal (auditory, visual, and tactile) and
that it contains an inherent computation of anticipation, agency,
and intention allows us to infer that hallucinations and delu-
sions can result from the same mechanism and possibly from
the same neural tissue or neural computations. Table 1 describes
putative associations between abnormal activity and symptoms.
Activation of this system in the absence of outside stimulation
could lead to visual hallucinations of action gesture sequences,
auditory hallucinations of voices, tactile gesture hallucinations or
a feeling of a presence or gesture (being watched or followed).
This aberrant activity would result in the perception of agency
and intention when no entity is present. Interference with the
social predictive or anticipatory activity of the neurons would
be hypothesized to interfere with social cognition and reaction.
The unconscious activation of gesture representations could lead
to persecutory delusions and delusions of jealousy (feeling of
action or presence of a person or people and the attribution of
intentions to these entities). The unconscious activation of gaze
gestures/head gestures (social attention gestures) could produce
the feeling of being at the center of attention or being watched
as is seen with delusions of reference. The unconscious activation
of gesture representations could also lead to the misperception of
agency for self-made actions (someone else is causing my actions
as in delusions of control; someone else is causing my thoughts as
in thought insertion).
Abnormal or over-active neural responses in these elements
would affect both judgments about other’s attention and the abil-
ity to perform attentional acts (as in delusions of reference, social
inattention, and general attentional problems). A recent study of
live face to face human interaction in conjunction with fMRI pro-
cedures showed that activity in the TPJ and the STS of human
subjects was differentially recruited during joint attention—see
Figure 1 (when compared to solo attention; Redcay et al., 2010).
The dynamic perception of emotional and attentional gestures
also partially overlaps with the regions that are involved in
constructing motor plans/intentions for producing emotional
and attentional gestures. This aspect allows for a conceptual
link between abnormal dynamic gesture and prosody percep-
tion, emotion recognition, and abnormal social and emotional
reactivity in schizophrenia (elaborated in later sections).
Prediction error, the mismatch between expectancy and expe-
rience, is thought to be a key abnormal element in schizophrenia
by many investigators (e.g., Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al.,
2010). Anticipatory responsiveness at the cellular level within this
system may participate in forming a neural prediction of self and
others actions/gestures and abnormal predictive activity would
interfere with producing a mismatch between expectancy and
experience.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 180 | 8
Wible Framework for understanding schizophrenia
Table 1 | Associations between symptoms, qualia, and brain dysfunction in schizophrenia.
Prevalent schizophrenic symptoms and
cognitive deficits—Qualia
Abnormal TPJ/PSTS function or overactive channel(s)
Auditory hallucinations
I hear a voice or voices. I feel as though people
are speaking to me
Overactive Dynamic Audio-Visual Person/Gesture: Dynamic gesture representations are
over-activated. Note that this may also cause abnormal processing of social prediction, intention,
and agency as these are components of dynamic gesture representation
Attentional High-jacking: Overactive gesture information high-jacks attention through gamma
synchronization of primary regions (e.g., auditory, visual, and tactile regions; in this case more for
auditory cortex)
Increased Saliency: Feed-forward of abnormally active dynamic audio-visual gesture information
to IPS saliency computation
Visual hallucinations
I see a person or people. I see action scenes
with people
Overactive Dynamic Visual Person/Gesture + Attentional high-jacking (more for visual cortex) +
Saliency
Paranoid or jealous delusions
I feel the presence of a person with
(emotionally negative) intentions related to me
Unconscious overactive dynamic person/gesture (either scenes, whole body or eyes or tactile
other/self representations leading to the “feeling” of a presence) + overactive dynamic
emotional gesture (possible activation of areas of SII that underlie higher order sexual
feelings—in del. jealousy) + intention, agency + saliency + attentional high-jacking. Note also
that STS neurons used to perceive gestures are tuned to detect social threat. Over-activation of
social threat representations would contribute to paranoia and jealousy
Delusions of reference
People are watching me. People are
communicating to me with their gestures.
Many things are salient
Unconscious overactive Dynamic person/gesture (eye gaze/face or body) + intention, agency +
saliency + attentional high-jacking
Delusions of mindreading, thought
broadcasting, thought withdrawal
Over-activation of theory of mind and voice representation for self and others. Unconscious
over-activation of dynamic gestures (head and eyes). Confusion of self/other agency for thoughts
Delusions of control
Someone is controlling me
Unconscious over-activation of dynamic visual person/gesture. Somatosensory Abnormalities in
Agency Representation or Vestibular Abnormalities (hypoagency). Failure to activate the
self-representation. Confusion between self and other representation
Grandiose delusions, delusions of sin/guilt
I am the cause of wide ranging events in my
world. I am all powerful. I am responsible
Hyper-agency. Over-activation of self representation
Attention deficits Attention high-jacked by abnormal activity in multimodal channels through gamma activation of
primary regions and through activation of saliency representations in IPS
Somatic hallucinations and delusions
My body/face/hands/legs are abnormal
Overactive somatic representation in EBA or somatosensory/vestibular cortices. (Note that EBA,
somatosensory, and vestibular cortex also participate in the perception of biological motion and
agency). Over-activation of the self-representation. Overactive self gesture-vestibular
representation high-jacks attention through gamma synchronization of primary regions (more for
tactile regions)
Affective flattening—unchanging facial
expression, paucity of expressive gestures,
poor eye contact and affective
nonresponsivity, lack of vocal inflection
Over-activation of the receptive emotional gesture regions (e.g., PSTS, somatosensory plus
insula/amygdala) that are also involved in emotional gesture expression. The supramarginal
(inferior parietal) and somatosensory cortex are used in prosody production and perception.
Abnormal activity in the gesture/prosody perception and production channels would interfere
with both perception and reaction
Cognitive deficit: impaired social cognition Abnormal activity in the gesture/prosody perception and production channels would interfere
with both perception and reaction
Abnormal social gesture prediction activity would lead to social slowing and awkwardness.
Abnormal co-activation of agency and intention (with gesture activation) causes abnormal social
responses
Over activation of social threat representations
Cognitive deficit: impairment in detection of
disgust and fear in facial expression
Overactive emotional gesture perception (e.g., PSTS, somatosensory plus insula/amygdala)
Cognitive deficit: impaired working memory TPJ/PSTS are involved in the representation of working memory contents; over-activation of
these regions would interfere with working memory
Symptoms, associated qualia and mechanisms. Examples of hypothesized mechanisms for producing the schizophrenic symptoms/qualia within the TPJ and PSTS.
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The perception of biological motion involves gamma band
synchronization. Gamma band activity was elicited by biological
motion in humans (in the form of point light displays) over pari-
etal cortex and right temporal cortex; whereas viewing inverted
point light displays only produced gamma band activity in early
visual regions (Pavlova et al., 2004). Some investigators posit a
central role for gamma band dysfunction (along with NMDA
abnormalities) in schizophrenia; this is discussed in the next
section (e.g., Lewis et al., 2005; Woo et al., 2010).
DYNAMIC MULTIMODAL PERCEPTUAL MECHANISMS
IN THE TPJ AND PSTS INVOLVE FEEDBACK TO
PRIMARY REGIONS AND THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF
ACTIVITY IN PRIMARY REGIONS
Under naturalistic conditions, real world inputs to the TPJ/PSTS
provide near simultaneous stimulation (e.g., audiovisual
speech/speech gestures) to create and activate dynamic multi-
modal representations of others and of the self. When activated,
multimodal representations (auditory, visual, and somatosen-
sory) in the TPJ/PSTS provide rapid feedback input to sensory
regions, and especially to the auditory cortex in animals and
humans; this feedback is pre-attentive, bottom up, and occurs
even under anesthesia (Foxe et al., 2002; Matsuhashi et al., 2004;
Macaluso, 2006). Regions that were traditionally thought to be
unimodal (sensory cortex) have been found to contain neurons
that respond to other modalities. Traditional unimodal regions
can be influenced by information from other modalities with
very short latencies (30ms after stimulus onset). An electro-
physiological study with monkeys showed that the functional
interaction (gamma band) between the STS and the auditory
cortex increased in strength during the presentation of dynamic
faces and voices relative to either type of stimulus presented
alone (Ghazanfar et al., 2008). The sustained gamma band
enhancement was also associated with an increase in neural
activity in the auditory cortex. This effect has also been found
for touch and sound (Kayser et al., 2005). fMRI signals in visual
cortex and in multisensory parietal regions correlate or show
high connectivity when visual and tactile stimuli are presented
at the same location (Macaluso et al., 2000). It was also shown
that visuo-tactile stimulation (when both were on the same side)
could cause increased activity in the visual cortex. Connectivity
analyses showed that this influence was through feedback from
inferior parietal multimodal regions (Macaluso et al., 2000). This
is both an attentional mechanism (augmented processing within
relevant channels) and a perceptual mechanism that can facilitate
processing during social interaction and dynamic real world
situations.
The congruent presentation of audiovisual speech/facial ges-
ture stimuli also produces supra-additive activity in the PSTS,
visual cortex, and auditory cortex in humans (Calvert, 2001). The
audiovisual presentation of emotional information conveyed by
intonation and facial expression (relative to unimodal presenta-
tion) resulted in enhanced behavioral accuracy in a classification
task (Kreifelts et al., 2007). This increased accuracy was related to
increased fMRI activity in the posterior superior temporal gyrus
and to enhanced connectivity between multimodal audiovisual
regions and auditory and visual association cortex.
Gamma has been shown to be abnormal in the TPJ of first
episode schizophrenic patients. They showed a reduction in
stimulus-locked gamma synchrony in left temporal and parieto-
occipital regions (Williams et al., 2009). Upon retest two and a
half years later, gamma synchrony was increased and the increase
was related to progressive gray matter reductions in left temporal
and parieto-occipital (as well as left frontal) regions.
Thus, in this review, it is assumed that in addition to the
normally described perceptual categories (auditory, visual, tac-
tile, olfactory, etc.) there are higher order constructed percepts
that play a central role in how individuals experience reality. The
term “constructed” denotes that the representation does not con-
sist of the disparate activation of neural elements but rather of an
extension of activation over time and across other brain regions.
Dynamic social perception under naturalistic circumstances has
been hypothesized to rely on this type of cross-modal phase mod-
ulation of information within different time frames (e.g., delta,
theta, and gamma) in different perceptual channels (Luo et al.,
2010).
The simple example of speaking with another person involves
the dynamic integration of voice and prosody, word and nar-
rative meaning, visual gestures, and past knowledge about the
person (to name a few examples of representational categories
that must be activated and perceived as a gestalt). Hence, these
multimodal feedback processes provide a mechanism by which
social context can direct attention, augmenting the salience or sig-
nal strength of speech sounds (Macaluso, 2006). Consistent with
this type of constructive representational account of TPJ/PSTS
function, patients with parietal lesions have difficulties with
gestalt/contextual perception or putting the pieces of the percep-
tual landscape together (Coslett and Lie, 2008).
One interesting and counterintuitive aspect of the
schizophrenic syndrome is that the level of auditory hallu-
cinations is most highly correlated with the levels of visual
and somatosensory hallucinations in schizophrenic subjects
(unpublished observations from large FBIRN dataset). Auditory
hallucinations were (among symptoms) the most highly corre-
lated with levels of visual hallucinations (r = 0.47; Wible and
Molina, in preparation) and with somatosensory hallucinations
(as well as global delusions). Abnormal feed forward influences
or feedback from multimodal regions to auditory cortex, visual
cortex, and somatosensory cortex could augment speech, visual
and somatosensory sensations respectively, resulting in increased
saliency of representations in these unimodal regions and
contributing to producing hallucinations. A recent study showed
that schizophrenics have deficits in multisensory integration
that were correlated with negative symptoms (Williams et al.,
2010). Patients who had both auditory and visual hallucinations
(compared to in only one modality) were especially impaired.
As was reviewed above, the sensory aspects of dynamic per-
ception (e.g., biological motion of the body and eyes; speech and
narrative) may be inextricably linked to the more conceptual or
higher order perception of intention, agency, and social attention
(Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Decety and Sommerville, 2003;
Decety and Grezes, 2006). There is also evidence that this process
need not be (exclusively) tied to the activation of motor regions.
Hence, the processes that are used for the perception of others
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may also be used in self representation (evidence for this will be
reviewed below).
SELF REPRESENTATION INVOLVES MULTIMODAL
INTEGRATIONWITHIN THE (RIGHT) TPJ
Recently, there have been profound advances in the under-
standing of self representation. As mentioned above, the feeling
of the presence of social entities can result from abnormali-
ties of the self-representation. The feeling of the presence of
an entity might also produce abnormal agency perception for
self-produced actions and thoughts. Most of the components
of the TPJ self representation are also used to represent others
and use a multimodal code (described in this section). Hence,
over-activation of auditory speech, visual gesture, or tactile rep-
resentations would be expected to be concomitant with problems
with self representation.
A derangement or dissociation of the self-representation may
underlie several neurological conditions or syndromes and may
result in symptoms that are similar (or in some cases identi-
cal) to schizophrenic symptoms. Self representation is composed
or constructed from multisensory input from multiple chan-
nels including vestibular (inferior parietal and posterior insula),
somatosensory, efference copy (primary motor—M1 and possi-
bly other prefrontal regions), proprioceptive (extrastriate body
area or EBA and possibly other regions), visuospatial perspec-
tive or gesture/action perception, as well as information from
stored body schemata (see Blanke and Arzy, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010).
One theoretical view of how these multimodal inputs can create
the self-representation is as follows from Tsakiris (2010): “First,
a pre-existing stored model of the body distinguishes between
objects that may or may not be part of one’s body. Second, on-line
anatomical and postural representations of the body modulate
the integration of multisensory information that leads to the
recalibration of visual and tactile coordinate systems. Third, the
resulting referral of tactile sensation will give rise to the subjective
experience of body-ownership. These processes involve a neural
network comprised of the right temporoparietal junction which
tests the incorporeability of the external object, the secondary
somatosensory cortex which maintains an on-line representation
of the body, the posterior parietal and ventral premotor cortices
which code for the recalibration of the hand-centered coordi-
nate systems, and the right posterior insula which underpins the
subjective experience of body-ownership.” (see Figure 3 yellow
region, Figure 5 and Table 2 for self processing summary infor-
mation). The information in Table 2 illustrates how aspects of
self processing overlap with the processes involved in perceiving
others and documents the multimodal nature of the represen-
tation. With regard to body ownership, the insula may play an
important role in vestibular function that contributes the feel-
ing of being the agent of movements. Craig (2009) posits that the
insula is involved in the perception of self-made movements and
thus may contribute to self-representation as well as emotional
awareness: “the insular cortex contains a somatotopic represen-
tation of the subjective feelings of one’s current movements as
FIGURE 5 | Details of self representation and the overlap between
self and other representation within the components of the
system (gray font). Note the extensive overlap between elements of the
system for self and other representation, movement and agency. Also note
that the components of this system are multimodal (auditory, tactile, and
visual).
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part of a representation of all feelings from the body.” With
regard to the stored body model, there may be both an egocen-
tric body schema which represents the position of the body and
parts within space and time and a more canonical allocentric
body structural description with codes the position of each body
segment within a standard body (reviewed in Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2009). Neuroimaging has found both types of body rep-
resentation in the intraparietal sulcus or IPS bordering on the
inferior parietal region and ventral premotor cortex (Corradi-
Dell’Acqua et al., 2009). A study explicitly comparing the two
types of body representation found evidence for an egocentric
body schema within secondary somatosensory cortex—SII and
an allocentric or structural representation in the left IPS/superior
parietal cortex (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009). Recently, it was
also found that the extrastriate body area which (EBA—an area in
the lateral occipito-temporal cortex) updates the representation
of the body after movement and may be important for labeling
movements as self-produced (Astafiev et al., 2004). The activ-
ity of the EBA may reflect incongruencies between internal body
action representations and external visual signals (David et al.,
2007). The EBA was first found to respond to images of bod-
ies or body parts. One theory of social inference states that the
EBA detects animated motion and engages the PSTS to predict
the goals and intentions from biological motion cues and from
the identification of the agent by fusiform and anterior tempo-
ral regions. The deviation of the perceived motion from what
was predicted produces a re-engagement of attention (McCarthy,
2010 Faces, Agents, and Animacy: Neurophysiological Studies of
Social Perception. Talk given at BCS MIT on Friday March 19
2010).
These regions that may be involved in self representation are
also activated during biological motion or seeing another per-
son/body, including the TPJ, somatosensory cortex, SII, EBA, IPS,
and ventral premotor regions (Wheaton et al., 2004; Pelphrey
et al., 2005). For example, SII is used to integrate touch in dif-
ferent parts of the body (see Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009 for
a summary). SII is not only sensitive to somatosensory informa-
tion, but responds to moving stimuli that are perceived through
touch, vision or audition (Bremmer et al., 2001). This area also
responds to touch regardless of whether it was felt on one’s own
skin or seen on another (Keysers et al., 2004). Hence, like the
dynamic representation of people and their movements, self-
representation is inherently multimodal and multimodal inputs
within the TPJ/PSTS may play a large role in this function. In
addition, evidence shows that the regions that are used to repre-
sent the self overlap with those that are used to represent others.
See Figure 5 and Table 2 for a summary of this overlapping
self/other representational system.
The constructive nature of the self-representation can be
readily demonstrated by experimental manipulation as seen in
phenomenon such as the rubber hand illusion and the body
swapping illusion (see Tsakiris, 2010 for a review). Altschuler
and Ramachandran (2007) published instructions for a simple
demonstration of disembodiment than is done using mirrors
and tactile stimulation; in this demonstration a lack of registra-
tion of touch and proprioception combined with the inability
to see one’s entire face produced the illusion. In another study,
subjects were induced to feel as though they momentarily inhab-
ited another body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Subjects stood
face to face with an unclothed rubber mannequin and were
outfitted with goggles so that their visuo-spatial perspective was
that of looking down onto the mannequin’s body, not their own
body. Simultaneous touch to both the subject and the mannequin
on the torso was sufficient to induce the illusion that subjects’
bodies had been swapped with the rubber mannequin. This study
shows that the feeling of ownership of the body or of embodi-
ment is constructed from dynamic convergent multimodal input
(in this case visual-spatial perspective and somatosensory input).
Hence, this type of dynamic multimodal or constructed repre-
sentation of the self can be disturbed by aberrant input from
multi-sensory neuronal representations. In other words, the same
over-activation that must be assumed to underlie the hallucina-
tory perception of a voice, person or touch should also affect the
self-representation.
Image-guided rTMS was used to create a “virtual lesion” over
the inferior parietal region (Uddin et al., 2006). This stimulation
selectively disrupted performance on a self–other discrimination
in healthy individuals providing strong evidence for this region’s
involvement in the representation of the self. A series of stud-
ies showed that in healthy individuals, a relative increase in TPJ
activity concurrent with activation of the insula signals exter-
nal agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Blakemore et al., 2003). In
hypnotized subjects, the misattribution of movements to an out-
side source produced increased activity of the TPJ (and a lack
of insula activity). This increased activity in the TPJ was also
found in several studies of schizophrenic individuals with pas-
sivity symptoms or delusions of control (Spence et al., 1997;
Franck et al., 2002; Blakemore et al., 2003; Farrer et al., 2004;
reviewed in Wible et al., 2009b). Thus, the TPJ is involved in
classifying movements (as well as ideas or thoughts) as external
and in representing imagined movements and others’ views or
thoughts; this functionality may contribute to delusions of con-
trol, the misattribution of one’s own thoughts to others, thought
withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and social cognitive difficul-
ties. Grandiose delusions, religious delusions and delusions of
guilt may result from feelings of hyperagency [I am responsible
for (creating, causing) many things] or from abnormal representa-
tions of embodiment and the extent or form of the body (e.g., I
have no bodily boundaries; I or my self is all encompassing or unified
with the environment; I am one with the universe).
The phenomena of body swapping and the rubber hand illu-
sion demonstrate the importance of simultaneous convergent
information from several perceptual channels. Stimulation or
brain damage that results in a disturbance in one or more of
these channels (most often in the vicinity of the TPJ) can result
in aberrant self-perception as in out of body experiences (OBEs)
or autoscopy (seeing one’s own body). OBE and autoscopy expe-
riences are thought to result from either the breakdown of
the integration of multimodal inputs or from discrepant inputs
from proprioceptive, tactile and visual-spatial (visual perspec-
tive) channels (see Blanke and Arzy, 2005 for a review). For
example, according to Blanke and Arzy (2005), OBE experiences
consist of “illusory reduplication, illusory self-location, illusory
perspective, and illusory agency.” The convergent nature of the
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self-representation is demonstrated by the fact that both OBE
and autoscopic hallucinations are influenced by the individual’s
position prior to the experience and hence are influenced by pro-
prioceptive and tactile representations. Stimulation or damage in
or near the TPJ can cause a type of autoscopy where the body
double is not seen, but experienced as a “presence” or multiple
“presences” (Brugger et al., 2006). Persecutory delusions, delu-
sions of jealousy, and delusions of reference all involve this feeling
of the presence of others. Hearing voices is also often accompa-
nied by the feeling of a presence of entitie(s) within the body or
mind. As previously discussed, the feeling of a presencemight also
interfere with agency signals or agency judgments for self-made
actions and thoughts.
The vestibular channel in particular was thought to be impor-
tant in OBE and vestibular sensations were evoked in a subject
where higher levels of current induced an OBE (Blanke et al.,
2002). The vestibular cortex may be located in the posterior insula
and inferior parietal regions (Brandt et al., 1998). Vestibular neu-
rons are themselves multimodal (they also respond to visual and
somatosensory information) and constitute a channel of input to
the self-representation (Grüsser et al., 1990). The vestibular sys-
tem does not provide self movement cues under conditions of
constant velocity; this is provided by large field visual motion
cues. Interestingly, Brandt et al. (1998) found that the vestibular
cortex in humans was inhibited by viewing radial flow informa-
tion (radial flow of visual cues is experienced during movement).
These observations show that even the most basic representa-
tional systems underlying the perception of agency are inherently
multimodal and are based in the TPJ region. Note that over-
activation in the system that normally represents visual radial flow
would be expected to essentially shut down vestibular agency cues
which would result in abnormal self agency judgments. This is
an example of how perceptual categories (e.g., visual person per-
ception and agency) that are affected in schizophrenia could be
related at a mechanistic level.
Further evidence for parietal involvement in social interac-
tions and for the overlap between self and other representation
comes from a single unit recording study that was performed in
two monkeys simultaneously (Fujii et al., 2007). In one condi-
tion, the monkeys were sitting across from each other but were
not interacting. In a second condition, the monkeys were inter-
acting with each other (there was food that either monkey could
grab). Parietal neurons coded for the individual monkey arm
position during the non-interactive condition. However, when
the monkeys started to interact, the same neurons started to
show complex activity related to both self and the other monkey’s
movements. Hence, aberrant activity could create problems with
both self representation and agency judgments through a number
of mechanisms.
Studies of human damage to the TPJ show that schizophrenia-
like symptoms can result from illusory perspective, illusory
agency, and problems with self representation/embodiment.
Somatoparaphrenia (Gerstmann, 1942) is a syndrome in which
the limbs or body on one side are believed to be absent and are
subject to illusions, delusions, and confabulations. In a review of
several cases in the literature, Vallar and Ronchi (2009) show that
for some patients, damage to the TPJ and/or insula is sufficient
to cause the syndrome, a finding consistent with historical views
of the syndrome (Nielsen, 1946; Critchley, 1953). According to
Critchley (1953) there are several neurological manifestations of
parietal disease, including the denial of hemiparesis; the belief that
limbs are missing or belong to another person; and the belief that
other’s limbs are ones own. An analysis of patients with verbal
asomatognosia (delusional denial of ownership of the limbs) ver-
sus those only showing only neglect (not delusional) showed that
damage to the right inferior-posterior parietal or supramarginal
gyrus and to the underlying white matter were the most frequent
sites of damage followed by the insula, the lenticular nucleus, and
the superior and middle temporal gyri (Feinberg et al., 1990).
Vallar and Ronchi (2009) consider somatoparaphrenia to be a
breakdown of multisensory integration and spatial representa-
tion of the self and body. Position sense and the awareness of the
body within a spatial reference frame as well as vestibular input
are thought to be central to the syndrome (Bisiach and Vallar,
2000; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). Individuals with somatopara-
phrenia can also present with visual hallucinations, illusory limb
movements, somatosensory delusions and hallucinations, and
delusions concerning the presence of people in the contralesional
part of space (Feinberg et al., 2000; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). All
of these symptoms are also evident in the schizophrenic syndrome.
In summary, evidence from neurological syndromes show that
agency and self representation are linked and rely on neural sub-
strates within the TPJ. Agency and self representation are also
linked to the representation of others and damage to the neural
representation of the self can lead to delusions and hallucinations
concerning the presence of other people or confusion between self
and other (see Table 2).
I discussed how circumscribed lesions of the TPJ or stimula-
tion of this area in human subjects can produce delusions; these
may stem from the stimulation or degradation of one or more of
the input channels that together produce the self-representation.
It is hypothesized that abnormal activity related to the con-
structed self representation may produce a number of symptoms
in schizophrenia. This activity could produce a form of autoscopy
where the patient experiences a “presence” or multiple “pres-
ences” resulting in persecutory delusions, delusions of reference
or delusions of jealousy (someone is following me, observing
me, with my wife). Delusions concerning the agency of thoughts
and motor acts could also be a manifestation of abnormal self
representation and could stem from any of the components of
the system that normally convey self agency (e.g., delusions of
control, delusions of mindreading, delusions of thought inser-
tion, withdrawal, and broadcasting). Delusions of guilt/sin and
grandiose/religious delusions may result from overactive feelings
of agency or overactive self representation. Previously I discussed
evidence for the involvement of these same regions in the repre-
sentation of others (biological motion/gesture, intention, agency,
and social anticipation); below I will discuss more evidence for
this with an emphasis on emotional processing.
DYNAMIC EMOTIONAL GESTURE PERCEPTION, VOICE
PERCEPTION, AND EXPRESSION
Schizophrenic individuals seem to be able to feel emotion, but
are less expressive (e.g., Kring et al., 1993; Myin-Germeys et al.,
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2000; Kring and Moran, 2008; see Mathews and Barch, 2010
for an alternative view and review). Over-activation in circuits
used to detect emotional gestures would interfere with emo-
tional perception and with emotional reaction. Schizophrenics
are impaired in affect recognition and show reduced affective
responsiveness. “Impaired facial affect recognition is a promi-
nent feature of schizophrenia that is linked to negative symptom
severity and poor functional outcome. These deficits are most
prominent for the detection of threat-related emotions such as
fear and anger. . . ” (quote from Leitman et al., 2008). The negative
symptoms of schizophrenia include affective flattening or blunt-
ing and are most often associated with a lack of facial expression,
eye contact, and vocal inflection.
Emotional expression perception is associated with activity in
the PSTS, the anterior insula, amygdala, and premotor cortex
facial regions (see Decety and Grezes, 2006). Some single neu-
rons in the STS of the monkey responded preferentially to facial
expressions (see Barraclough et al., 2005 for a review). An fMRI
study explicitly contrasted attention to the emotional expression
with attention to identity (Narumoto et al., 2001). Face responsive
regions were identified as the fusiform, right STS, and intrapari-
etal sulcus. Attention to emotion enhanced the activity of the right
STS compared with attention to the face. The human PSTS also
participates in the perception of prosody (Wildgruber et al., 2005;
Leitman et al., 2010). Lesions within the right primary/secondary
somatosensory cortex, anterior supramarginal gyrus (part of infe-
rior parietal cortex), insula and inferior motor regions interfere
with the ability to perceive facial emotion and prosody (Adolphs
et al., 2000, 2002; regions shown in Figure 6).
Viewing facial expressions, even when one is not consciously
aware of them, creates a more subtle version of the expression on
the viewer’s face (Wallbott, 1991; Dimberg et al., 2000; Decety and
Grezes, 2006). When subjects are required to either observe or to
imitate (produce) emotional facial expressions, the STS, anterior
insula, amygdala, and premotor cortex show increased activity
(Carr et al., 2003). Collectively these data support the notion
that the regions for perceiving emotional gestures in others over-
lap with those for planning reactions for response production.
Hence dynamic emotional perception (facial and body gestures)
and dynamic emotional responsiveness (especially of the face and
eyes) are represented and executed by overlapping or adjacent cir-
cuits (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
Thus, the PSTS and inferior parietal regions are involved in the
FIGURE 6 | Figure from a lesion analysis; regions damage in patients
showing deficits in emotional facial expression perception and
prosody perception (Adolphs et al., 2002—Figure 3b). Reprinted with
permission from Adolphs et al. (2002). Copyright 2002 by the American
Psychological Association, Inc.
perception and production of emotional expression and prosody.
Abnormal activity in these regions would be expected to interfere
with emotional perception as well as reactivity (e.g., asociality, a
paucity of vocal inflection, and facial expression).
Recent evidence shows that the right TPJmay be specialized for
detecting dynamic emotionally negative or threatening gestures
andmay be evenmore important in this regard than the amygdala
(see Figure 7). A recent study found that 2 patients with bilateral
amygdala damage were not impaired in the recognition of fear from
dynamic body expressions, leading to the conclusion that there are
other regions that play a key role in this function (Atkinson et al.,
2007; see also Marian et al., 2009; Cristinzio et al., 2010). In addi-
tion, damage to the amygdala (at least in adults) does not always
change the subjective experience of fear (Phelps and Anderson,
1997; Kober et al., 2008). A study of brain damaged patients
showed that the inability to recognize fear expressions was asso-
ciated with damage to the inferior parietal/precentral region in
the right hemisphere (Adolphs et al., 1996); this region is shown
in purple in Figure 7. Evidence from ERP recording in humans
and single unit recording in the monkey STS indicates that there
is a neural bias for the detection of potentially threatening biological
motion (see review in Perrett et al., 1985a; Oram and Perrett, 1994;
Wheaton et al., 2001; Puce and Perrett, 2003). Hence, although
single neurons in the STS are used to perceive dynamic gestures;
they are tuned or biased for the rapid identification of threat. fMRI
studies now show that dynamic and static facial and body expres-
sions of negative emotions (e.g., fear) activate regions in the TPJ
and premotor cortex more than neutral or positive emotions,
especially on the right—see Figure 7 (Lotze et al., 2006; Grezes
et al., 2007; Carter and Pelphrey, 2008). Note also that stimulation
of the lateral occipital-temporal region results in hallucinations
of complex (sometimes violent) visual action scenes involving
people (discussed above). The symptoms of post-traumatic stress
FIGURE 7 | Data from three studies of negative emotion. Red—fMRI
activation in the right posterior STS was positively correlated with the
perception of negative valence expressions from Lotze et al. (2006).
Pink—fMRI activation of the right posterior temporal TPJ region is related
to perceiving fear from body expressions re-representation from Grezes
et al. (2007). Purple—core region where lesions in human subjects cause
an inability to recognize negative valence expressions re-representation
from Adolphs et al. (1996). Note also that activation of the right posterior
STS is also related to jealousy (Rilling et al., 2004; Takahashi et al., 2006).
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disorder (PTSD) may result from hippocampal overactivation of
the PSTS/TPJ as these regions are involved in threat-fear per-
ception and in dynamic social memory. This would explain the
dissociative aspects (self processing) of the disease as well as the
flashbacks and other phenomenon.
It is hypothesized that the reduced emotional reactivity seen
in schizophrenia is due to abnormalities in the circuits used to
perceive dynamic emotional expressions and to produce inten-
tions or premotor plans for action/reaction. In addition, because
the system is tuned to detect threat, fear and threat related stim-
uli should be differentially affected. Hence, the regions that are
used in dynamic emotional perception and reaction would be
predicted to have abnormally high activity that would be related
to symptoms such as persecutory delusions, delusions of jealousy
and flat affect; individuals with these symptoms should also show
reduced activity in subtractive neuroimaging studies (and per-
haps reduced perceptual capabilities) during the perception of
dynamic negative emotions (because activity is increased in the
baseline in these regions). The negative or frightening tone of
some symptoms may arise from the fact that over-activation may
produce the feeling of being in a socially threatening situation.
Most of the studies of emotional perception have used
static stimuli and many have documented abnormalities in
schizophrenia (see discussion of controversies in Russell et al.,
2007; Carter et al., 2009). A well-controlled study of facial emo-
tion recognition showed that schizophrenic subjects were more
likely to identify neutral facial expressions as having a negative
valence (Kohler et al., 2003). In that study, schizophrenic sub-
jects showed a reduced ability to recognize emotions, but were
specifically impaired in recognition of fearful, disgusted, and
neutral expressions. Abnormal threat perception in schizophre-
nia has also been a consistently replicated finding (Gur et al.,
2007; Russell et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2008). Over-activation
was found to interfere with affect recognition (for anger and
fear or threat related emotions) and to be correlated with lev-
els of flat affect (especially for fear; Gur et al., 2007). A fur-
ther analysis of the regions producing neural responses to static
fear processing showed abnormally higher correlations (using
CORANOVA) between occipital and superior temporal regions
in schizophrenic subjects (Leitman et al., 2008). A subsequent
study of threat expression in faces showed that higher levels
of symptoms were related to increases in limbic threat related
responses and decreased recognition memory related responses
in cortical regions suggesting that threat related processing may
interfere with cognition in schizophrenia (Satterthwaite et al.,
2010). Hence these findings support our supposition that over-
activity in this system for perceiving and producing dynamic
emotional gestures can interfere with social/emotional percep-
tion and with reactivity (resulting in flat affect). This part of the
framework is unique in specifying concrete links between emo-
tional reactivity and the differential difficulties with threat related
emotions in schizophrenia.
One study found direct evidence for the link between emo-
tional reactivity and emotional perception in schizophrenia.
Among negative symptoms, the levels of flat affect uniquely pre-
dicted performance on emotional perception/differentiation tasks
(Gur et al., 2006). Affect (face/voice) recognition was also found
to be related to measures of social functioning in schizophrenia
(Hooker and Park, 2002). A lack of expressivity in schizophrenia
was associated with poor social competence and with impaired
understanding of others’ minds or theory of mind in another
study (Brune et al., 2009). Hence, just as emotional expression
and perception overlap at the neural level, perception and expres-
sion dysfunction are both found in the schizophrenic syndrome
and may result in social cognitive and theory of mind deficits in
these individuals as well as deficits in affective reactivity (flat affect
and facial non-responsiveness).
In summary, evidence was presented showing that the percep-
tion of fearful body/face expressions involves the right PSTS, infe-
rior parietal and precentral regions (see Atkinson and Adolphs,
2005 for a review). Dynamic emotional perception is subserved
by the TPJ, the anterior insula and adjacent premotor regions (as
well as the amygdala). Although it is used in the perception of
all emotions, this dynamic system is biased to detect threatening
stimuli. This bias may at least partially explain the propensity of
negative or threatening experiential delusions seen in schizophre-
nia. For example, one study found that deluded schizophrenic
patients were more likely to attribute an emotional bias to neu-
tral stimuli in one study using words (Holt et al., 2006). As would
be predicted by this framework, the perception of threat related
emotions is particularly impaired in schizophrenia. In addition,
the abnormal perception and production of emotion was found
to be related to social function and theory of mind as would be
predicted from the overlap of these functions within the TPJ.
Over-activation of the hippocampus might also cause abnor-
mally high activation in the amygdala (because they are adjacent)
and this may additionally bias the abnormal experiences by con-
tributing a negative emotional tone. Overactive face/body gesture
representations would be predicted to contribute a “feeling” of
threat or of being in a socially fearful situation. If these neu-
ral elements are tuned to detect threat, then over-activation of
these regions may mimic the activation inherent to real life social
threat and may signal to the person that they are in a threatening
situation. This may produce symptoms such as delusions of ref-
erence and persecutory/paranoid/jealous delusions (Wible et al.,
2009a). The right TPJ has also been implicated in the processing
of desire (Saxe andWexler, 2005) and right PSTS activity uniquely
correlates with jealousy and male sexual competition in humans
and monkeys (Rilling et al., 2004; Takahashi et al., 2006). The
systems for detecting and reacting to social threat and sexual com-
petition may be linked because of our evolutionary history; the
behaviors are linked in non-human primates and other animals.
Hence it is hypothesized that overactive gesture representations
in the TPJ could also result in delusions of jealousy. These con-
jectures are consistent with descriptions of subjective experience
from patients; see this quote from Chadwick (2007): “. . . the—so
to speak—‘volume control’ on my emotions of anger, fear, and
sex seemed to be as if turned up too high. I found I was for-
ever trying to tranquilize myself. The high anger and fear not
only operated as basic drives but also produced a very punitive
conscience.” This quote also suggests that over-activation of this
system whose activity is tuned to perceive social threat and is
involved in sexual competition might contribute to delusions of
sin/guilt.
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GAZE PERCEPTION AND SOCIAL ATTENTION
In addition to conveying emotion, dynamic gestures of the head
and eyes convey the focus of attention and may aid in represent-
ing other’s intentions and thoughts (Perrett et al., 1985b, 1992;
Kleinke, 1986; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Allison et al., 2000;
Emery, 2000). Hence dynamic representations of emotional ges-
ture and attention may be used in processing and perceiving more
conceptual aspects of social cognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997;
Morris et al., 2008). Damage to the posterior superior tempo-
ral/PSTS and inferior parietal regions impair the perception of
gaze direction and attentional orienting from gaze showing that
they are core substrates for these functions (Boddaert et al., 2004;
Akiyama et al., 2006). These regions form part of a “ventral”
attention system (Corbetta et al., 2008; Nummenmaa et al., 2010).
A recent report (Nummenmaa et al., 2010) used psychophysio-
logical interactions (PPIs) to identify regions showing differential
connectivity with core face perception structures when viewing
gaze shifts relative to a control condition (blinking). This tech-
nique identified regions (within a core face processing network)
that showed a change in connectivity when individuals viewed
gaze shifts as opposed to blinks. The regions identified are shown
in Figure 8 and include a system in red identified from a seed in
PSTS (MT/V5, PSTS, intraparietal sulcus, frontal eye fields (FEF),
STG/STS, supramarginal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus) and a
system in blue identified from a fusiform seed (fusiform gyrus,
STG/STS and middle frontal gyrus) with the overlap of the two
systems shown in green. Gaze perception is modulated by emo-
tional gestures. Angry faces are more likely to be perceived as
having a direct gaze or as looking at the subject when compared
to fearful or neutral faces (Ewbank et al., 2009).
Gaze representations could act to guide attention and to
produce the gamma synchronization of more primary cortical
regions as was reviewed above. In the complex and multi-layered
natural environment, attentional guidance through gestures may
be thought of as part of the act of perception, because without this
automatic computation, perception during social interaction might
become overwhelmed and break down. These concrete/embodied
FIGURE 8 | Results from an fMRI study of gaze processing; figure from
(Nummenmaa et al., 2010). That study used psychophysiological
interaction to identify regions showing differential connectivity with core
face perception regions (either PSTS or fusiform or both regions) when
viewing gaze shifts relative to a control condition (blinking). Shown are a
system in red identified from a seed in PSTS (MT/V5, PSTS, Intraparietal
sulcus, frontal eye fields, STG/STS, supramarginal gyrus, and middle frontal
gyrus) and a system in blue identified from a fusiform seed (fusiform gyrus,
STG/STS, and middle frontal gyrus) with the overlap of the two systems
shown in green (superior temporal and middle frontal gyri). Figure 2, top
panel with permission from Nummenmaa et al. (2010). Open Acess article.
social attention mechanisms allow for prioritizing input and
comprehending within a social context. This overlap between
gaze/gesture processing and the more conceptual aspects of social
cognition allows for the hypothesis that abnormal activity within
regions that show activity related to visual (multimodal) gesture
processing could also automatically confer erroneous information
regarding the focus of social attention. Patients with delusions
of reference often feel as though they are being watched. Those
with persecutory delusions often feel as though they are being
followed or watched and hence are the center of attention for
some shadowy group of individuals. The abnormal computation
of social attention could result in these delusions, as well as in
social cognitive deficits and abnormal social/facial reactivity (as
in flat affect and social inattentiveness). Schizophrenic subjects
have been shown in a number of studies to have abnormal voli-
tional saccades (e.g., Manoach et al., 2002) however recent studies
indicate that this abnormality may be linked to cingulate cortex
(Manoach et al., 2007; Tu et al., 2010).
SALIENCY AND THE INTRAPARIETAL SULCUS OR IPS
Schizophrenia has been hypothesized to be a result of abnormal
motivational salience detection or computation (Kapur, 2003;
Roiser et al., 2009; Walter et al., 2010). The computation of pre-
diction error is thought by many investigators to be related to
dopamine and the ventral striatal system with the differential
valence of stimuli being conveyed by the orbitofrontal and ante-
rior insula cortices (Jensen et al., 2007). However, within the
IPS there are modules for the computation of salience. The IPS
borders the inferior parietal cortex and receives input from the
systems discussed in this paper. The IPS is involved in directing
eye gaze as well as saliency detection, especially within the lat-
eral intraparietal region (LIP). The LIP is thought to contain a
saliency map (for all types of salience) that is used to determine
the moment to moment focus of attention (Gottlieb, 2007). This
map is constructed dynamically and modulated by behavioral
context, goals and memory and is independent of hedonic value
(Thompson and Bichot, 2005; Klein et al., 2008). Neurons in the
macaque LIP were found to be associated with gaze following
and showed predictive and “mirror” activity to gaze (Shepherd
et al., 2009). The gaze mirror neurons were active both when the
subject looked in the preferred direction of the neuron but also
when an observed monkey looked in that direction, regardless
of the task. The latencies of the neurons matched gaze follow-
ing behavior. Another set of neurons encoded saliency within
the task constraints. The LIP is connected to the perirhinal and
parahippocampal regions (reviewed in Blatt et al., 1990; Gottlieb,
2007). Hence, aberrant salience computation or detection could
be conferred by abnormal activity in the intraparietal region in
schizophrenia due to abnormal input from the TPJ/PSTS regions.
THEORY OF MIND AND THE TPJ
The perception of others also involves the ability to understand
and represent others mental states. Theory of mind is the abil-
ity to attribute and represent other’s thoughts, desires, beliefs,
and intentions (Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Decety and Grezes, 2006;
Ochsner, 2008). Subjects can predict the goals of perceived actions
and read or surmise the intentions of a person who is acting
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(Saxe and Wexler, 2005). Recent evidence shows that the TPJ is
the core neural substrate for this function. Schizophrenic indi-
viduals are deficient in social and theory of mind processing
(Sarfati et al., 1997, 1999; Pickup and Frith, 2001; Brunet et al.,
2003a,b; Bora et al., 2009) and show abnormal activity during
tasks which requiremental state attribution (e.g., Andreasen et al.,
2008; see Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006). Schizophrenic per-
formance was similar to that of subjects with high functioning
autism on a battery of social cognitive tasks (Couture et al., 2010).
Because of a consistent profile of activation in neuroimaging
studies of social perception, the right TPJ has been designated by
some investigators as “the social brain area” (Decety and Grezes,
2006). Activation in the right TPJ has been found to be spe-
cific to conditions that require “thinking about thoughts” relative
to thinking about other socially relevant information (Saxe and
Wexler, 2005). Right TPJ activity is selective to theory of mind
and not to attention, memory demands, or expectations (Saxe
and Wexler, 2005; Scholz et al., 2009; Young et al., 2010); see
Figure 9. Other areas such as the Left TPJ, posterior cingulate and
medial prefrontal cortex did not show such a selective response
profile (Saxe andWexler, 2005). Humans with lesions of the ante-
rior cingulate or medial prefrontal cortex have not been found
to be impaired in tasks measuring theory of mind (Bach et al.,
2000; Bird et al., 2004; Baird et al., 2006). Patients with damage
to the right TPJ have not been tested in these tasks, but damage
to the left TPJ does result in an impairment of theory of mind
(Samson et al., 2004; see Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe and Wexler,
discussion section for a review). Saxe and Wexler (2005) postu-
late that the left TPJ may play a role in processing more enduring
socially relevant traits, while the right TPJ plays a role in the attri-
bution of short lived or transitive mental states (emotions and
situation specific thoughts). Abnormal activity in TPJ theory of
mind regions could interfere with normal social cognitive func-
tion in schizophrenia. Above I described how neurons that are
used to perceive dynamic gestures are tuned to “predict” or tuned
FIGURE 9 | Figure from Young et al. (2010)—Figure 3 from their
paper—upper half. Theory of mind activation in the TPJ. TPJ regions
where the fMRI activation was higher for stories about mental
representations (e.g., false beliefs) than stories about physical
representations such as false photographs. Reprinted with permission from
Figure 3: Young et al. (2010). Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.
to detect future gesture sequences. Interference with this auto-
matic predictive computation would be predicted to effect theory
of mind functioning. The adjacency of regions subserving social
attention, social emotional gesture perception, and theory of
mind allows for hypothesized links between schizophrenic symp-
toms having to do with the abnormal social perception and social
responding to theory of mind deficits. Schizophrenic delusions
sometimes include the belief that they can read others’ thoughts
and also that others can hear their thoughts. These symptoms may
also stem from the dysfunction of the theory ofmind regions (e.g.,
lead to a feeling of mindreading).
LANGUAGE AND TPJ FUNCTION
For the sake of brevity, the role of the TPJ in language related
symptoms will be described only briefly in this manuscript,
although they are of central importance to the syndrome; see
Ditman and Kuperberg (2010) for a recent review. The arguments
put forth by Redcay (2008) for the PSTS being involved in autism
are also germane to schizophrenia. In development we perceive
gestures in others (e.g., eye gaze, voice, emotional gestures) and
at the same time we receive information from self-made gestures
(e.g., visual-spatial perspective, somatosensory, and vestibular
information). Redcay (2008) reviews evidence that the perception
of gestures in others that is experienced along with our own ges-
tures and feelings may form the scaffolding on which the higher
order multimodal perception of self, social attention, intention,
agency and language are based (Redcay, 2008). This argument is
aligned with much of the evidence reviewed in this manuscript
(e.g., body swapping is caused by perturbations in visual perspec-
tive and touch). Eye gaze and other gestures experienced within
the context of joint or social attention have been proposed to form
part of the basis for language learning; eye gaze and joint atten-
tion are dependant on TPJ processing (see Redcay, 2008; Redcay
et al., 2010). As mentioned above, audiovisual speech representa-
tion covers a large portion of the territory of the PSTS, including
superior temporal and middle/inferior temporal regions in the
posterior temporal lobe (Calvert and Campbell, 2003; Wright
et al., 2003; Lotze et al., 2006; see Figure 1 in Wible et al.,
2009b). A large portion of the TPJ (bilaterally) is also prefer-
entially involved in narrative comprehension when compared to
word or even sentence comprehension (see Figure 10 below from
FIGURE 10 | Figure from Xu et al. (2005)—bottom panel of Figure 3 in
that paper. Showing activation of the TPJ to narrative comprehension
(relative to sentence comprehension). Reprinted from Xu et al. (2005).
Copyright (2005) used with permission from Elsevier.
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Redcay (2008); originally from Xu et al. (2005)—bottom panel
of their Figure 3). Schizophrenic subjects are deficient in generat-
ing or building linguistic context. They are not able to construct
coherence links across sentences to build-up overall global con-
text during early phases of discourse comprehension (Ditman and
Kuperberg, 2010). A careful analysis of the deficits and lesion
sites in aphasia patients showed that when other confounding
deficits were excluded, single word semantic processing deficits
were found to be associated with the left posterior temporal and
inferior parietal regions (Hart and Gordon, 1990). Hence the TPJ
region is also involved in semantic comprehension (perhaps using
similar computational and processing structures as are used for
social perception).
The role of the TPJ/PSTS in audiovisual language, narra-
tive comprehension and semantic representation may be linked
to aspects of thought disorder and to concreteness seen in
schizophrenia (Wible et al., 2009b). Auditory hallucinations may
result from over-activation of PSTS audio-visual speech represen-
tations which would result in hearing a voice or voices and also
the feeling of a presence or another speaking. This activation of
audiovisual speech gestures may also provide feedback to activate
more primary auditory regions augmenting the signal further and
increasing attention to the “voices.” Levels of auditory verbal hal-
lucinations showed correlations with volumetric measures of the
superior temporal region and with diffusion tensor imaging mea-
sures of white matter in tracts connecting posterior temporal and
inferior parietal regions (Shenton et al., 2001; Hubl et al., 2004).
Auditory hallucinations were linked to fMRI activity in inferior
parietal and PSTS regions in a study of a large consortium study of
schizophrenia (Wible et al., 2009a) as well as other studies, includ-
ing a study examining a single hallucinating subject with fMRI
(e.g., Lennox et al., 1999). Previous studies from our laboratory
also found that levels of thought disorder and auditory halluci-
nations were associated with activity in the inferior parietal and
PSTS regions in chronic schizophrenic subjects (Han et al., 2007;
Hashimoto et al., 2010).
HUMAN FUNCTIONAL IMAGING OF THE TPJ: BOTTOM
UP ATTENTION, RECOLLECTIVE SUCCESS, WORKING
MEMORY, SELF PROJECTION THROUGH TIME AND
SPACE, AND A CORTICAL HUB THAT IS ACTIVE
DURING TASK AND RESTING STATES
Bottom up or reflexive attention and episodic retrieval have both
been linked to inferior parietal/TPJ regions as shown by a recent
review (Hutchinson et al., 2009). The TPJ was recently found to be
a cortical hub and to be active both in rest and task states (Buckner
et al., 2009). Note that this is different than the previous theoreti-
cal construct of a “defaultmode” network. Cortical hubswere also
found in the posterior cingulate, and medial/lateral prefrontal
cortices. It was hypothesized that regions active in the resting
state are involved in “constructing self-relevant mental simula-
tions that are exploited by a wide range of functions including
remembering, thinking about the future, and inferring the per-
spectives and thoughts of other people” (Quote from Buckner
et al., 2008). In that paper, schizophrenia was conceptualized as
the loss of a strong boundary between perception from imagined
and real scenarios, including the boundary between self and other
perception. That manuscript also reviews the extensive evidence
for abnormal default mode activity in schizophrenia. The (right)
TPJ has also been hypothesized to be involved in self projection
not only through space, but through time (Arzy et al., 2011). The
aberrant perception of time and space in schizotypal personality
disorder was found to be positively correlated with the duration
of activation in the right TPJ and right occipito-temporal cortex
(as well as the left anterior temporal regions; Arzy et al., 2011).
Arzy et al. (2011) conceptualize some aspects of the schizophre-
nia spectrum syndrome as aberrant self projection through both
time and space and the inability to bind together experienced life
events into a cohesive whole; this autonoetic awareness forms part
of the self-representation.
PRODROMAL SYMPTOMS AND THE TPJ
The phenomenology of the prodromal phase of schizophrenia
has been linked to inferior parietal dysfunction. Torrey (2007)
recently described the convergence between early symptoms and
neurological signs of inferior parietal damage. He noted that
prodromal patients frequently present with disorders of body
image. Here I note some examples of prodromal symptoms
that may reflect the abnormal activation of PSTS/inferior pari-
etal multimodal representations. The quotes shown below are
from published accounts (McGhie and Chapman, 1961; Torrey,
2007). Descriptions of prodromal symptoms are grouped into
several categories as follows: (1) Symptoms reflecting the abnor-
mal capture of bottom up attention: “Everything seems to grip
my attention although I am not particularly interested in any-
thing.” “Everything that is going on seems to be picked up by
me. . .” “Noises all seem to be louder.” “Colors seem to be brighter
now.” (2) Symptoms reflecting the over-activation of biological
motion representations by environmental stimuli: “Everything
looked vibrant, especially red; . . . all sorts of objects-chairs, build-
ings, obstacles-took on a life of their own; they seemed to make
threatening gestures, to have an animistic outlook. . . . I feel that
everything is coming toward me.” (3) Symptoms reflecting the
inability to integrate sensory data into a coherent pattern as is
seen in patients with lesions of TPJ (Coslett and Lie, 2008): “I
have to put things together in my head. If I look at my watch I see
the watchstrap, watch, face, hands and so on, then I have got to
put them together to get it into one piece.” “Everything is in bits.
You put the picture up bit by bit in your head.” (4) Symptoms
reflecting deficient narrative comprehension: “I can concentrate
quite well on what people are saying if they talk simply. It is when
they go into long sentences that I lose the meanings. The subjec-
tive experience in schizophrenia was described in a recent paper
by a researcher who has the disease (Chadwick, 2007). He too
described an inability of the normally automatic and unconscious
integration of sensory data. “. . . I would have to grasp situations
by apprehending their parts rather than grasping them intuitively
and holistically.”
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER THEORETICAL VIEWS
This framework is at least partially based on theoretical views
of schizophrenia that posit specific neurotransmitter related
abnormalities such as NMDA processing (Coyle, 2006; Butler
et al., 2009; Javitt, 2009). The views here are consistent with
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the supposition that the magnocellular system is differentially
affected by abnormal NMDA processing in schizophrenia (Javitt,
2009). It is assumed that the TPJ is especially vulnerable to pro-
cessing abnormalities because of its relationship to hippocampal
processing which is heavily dependant on NMDA/GABA and
because it is part of the magnocellular visual processing stream.
The framework is partially consistent with some views that
emphasize saliency, perceptual/emotional bias and other putative
psychological difficulties (e.g., Frith et al., 1992; Freeman et al.,
2002; Kapur, 2003; Holt et al., 2006) and may provide a way
to further conceptualize and test these alternatives. Our focus
on social cognition in schizophrenia is similar to the focus of
several other groups and is based on their experimental work
(Carter, 2006; Hoffman, 2007; Ochsner, 2008; Carter et al., 2009;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Our views are also partially consis-
tent with those positing abnormal or deficient corollary discharge
signals (Whitford et al., 2012). A current version of this theory
links abnormal corollary discharge to abnormal salience compu-
tation in schizophrenia and to dopamine. I posit that abnormal
feedback from self-initiated actions could be one component of
the syndrome, but my view focuses on feedback from (possi-
bly M1) to inferior parietal cortex, not from DLPFC to auditory
cortex. A focus on the hippocampus is also found in a rodent
model of schizophrenia in which a neonatal ventral hippocampal
lesion is made and leads to changes in interneurons in the pre-
frontal cortex. This neonatal lesion affects dopamine—resulting
in abnormal prefrontal dopamine-glutamate interactions that
emerge after puberty (Tseng et al., 2007). This theory differs
from ours in terms of the focus on dopamine and frontal lobe
(see discussion below). In another animal (rodent) model of
schizophrenia, either the abnormal function or loss of fast-spiking
interneurons that contain the calcium-binding protein parval-
bumin (PV) is thought to produce gamma band synchrony
deficits resulting in schizophrenia (e.g., Woo et al., 2010; Powell
et al., 2012). Changes in PV interneurons can occur in adoles-
cence (in animal models) subsequent to early oxidative stress.
Developmental interventions such as the application of anNMDA
receptor antagonist or social isolation in an early postnatal period
has been shown to produce changes in PV interneurons in adoles-
cence in these animal models and these interneurons are thought
to be involved in the generation of gamma oscillations (Woo et al.,
2010; Powell et al., 2012). The current framework does propose
a (more localized) role for gamma oscillations in schizophrenia.
However, the current framework postulates a special role for the
TPJ, not widespread brain abnormalities, in producing symp-
toms. Note that widespread gamma abnormalities have also been
found in tinnitus, Alzheimer’s disease, autism, Tourette’s syn-
drome, bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, and traumatic
brain injury (Schlee et al., 2009; Woo et al., 2010).
Hence, although some components are overlapping with other
theories of schizophrenia, our focus and conceptualization of
the syndrome is significantly different from these views in many
respects. Perhaps the most important differences have to do
with the identification of psychological functions and brain
regions that are relevant to understanding schizophrenia. Amajor
focus for most schizophrenia research has been on DLPFC and
medial prefrontal regions in working memory, cognitive control,
conflict detection and possibly social cognition (Manoach, 2003;
Goldman-Rakic et al., 2004; Carter and van Veen, 2007; Tan et al.,
2007; Kerns et al., 2008; Polli et al., 2008). Several findings within
the field of cognitive neuroscience within the last several years
impact upon some of the more prevalent views of prefrontal
function and the relationship between frontal dysfunction and
schizophrenia; these viewsmay need to be updated to some extent
to reflect new findings (Wible, 2012). Theory of mind was pre-
viously thought to depend on the anterior cingulate or paracin-
gulate region, but recent lesion data have challenged this view
(Bird et al., 2004; Baird et al., 2006; Wible, 2012). However, PSTS
damage does cause theory of mind deficits (Samson et al., 2004).
Anterior cingulate lesions also do not produce deficiencies in cog-
nitive control or indices of prediction error asmeasured by several
types of tasks including performance of the Stroop and go-no
go tasks (e.g., Fellows and Farah, 2005; Baird et al., 2006; Wible,
2012). Although there is still much controversy regarding the role
of the prefrontal cortex in memory, the often hypothesized asso-
ciation between working memory maintenance, DLPFC cortex,
and schizophrenia may have to be revised (for example see Ghent
et al., 1962; Petrides et al., 1993; Postle, 2006; Buchsbaum and
D’Esposito, 2008). The lack of relationship between human pre-
frontal damage and working memory (maintenance/rehearsal)
impairment is illustrated by the following quote from D’Esposito
and Postle (1999): “We found that none of the eleven studies of
forward verbal and spatial span in patients with prefrontal cor-
tical lesions that we reviewed (reflecting the performance of 166
individual patients) demonstrated a statistically significant deficit
relative to normal controls.” That review goes on to state that
lesions in the inferior parietal cortex are associated with disrupted
working memory. This lack of association between frontal cortex
damage and working memory impairment was also found years
before by Frisk and Milner (1990) who used patients with frontal
cortex damage to test Baddeley’s theory that damage to the frontal
cortex would be associated with an overall reduction in working
memory capacity. They did not observe a relationship between
frontal lobe damage and working memory performance on any of
their measures. Recent theories posit that frontostriatal circuitry
may be involved in the selection of appropriate motor responses
based on working memory content (e.g., Curtis and D’Esposito,
2003; Manoach et al., 2003). Hence I hypothesize that the working
memory deficits in schizophrenia stem primarily from abnormal
TPJ activity since the TPJ shows activity related to working mem-
ory and lesions of this region produce working memory deficits
(reviewed in Wible et al., 2009b). A recent study from our labo-
ratory provides evidence for a link between abnormal activity in
TPJ working memory circuits and symptoms (Hashimoto et al.,
2010).
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS
In summary, it is hypothesized that over-activation of the TPJ
region is the core processing abnormality in schizophrenia and
results in the phenomenology of the syndrome; see Table 1 for
examples. This over-activation or prolonged activation (Arzy
et al., 2006, 2011) could stem from NMDA/GABA abnormalities
and over-activation of the hippocampus perhaps in conjunction
with abnormal processing in the magnocellular stream (Coyle,
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2006; Woo et al., 2008; Javitt, 2009). TPJ activity is highly cor-
related with hippocampal system activity. The hippocampus is
highly prone to excitotoxic damage from many sources (also
prone to epilepsy). Over-activation from the hippocampus could
reach a peak around adolescence. The CA1 layer of the hippocam-
pus undergoes myelination at that time and sex hormones would
be influencing hippocampal activity. The TPJ also undergoes
myelination and development in this late stage. The coincidence
of neural development and sex hormone activity might act to
produce aberrant activity in this circuit that results in symp-
toms. Fast spiking PV interneurons have been implicated in the
pathogenesis of both schizophrenia and epilepsy (Li et al., 2011).
Schizophrenic abnormalities may be caused by a chronic low level
over-excitation that is either initiated or exacerbated during ado-
lescence. Episodes of prolonged or heightened activity would be
expected to ultimately change the processing of both the hip-
pocampus and TPJ/PSTS and to ultimately lead to excitotoxic
tissue loss over time. These abnormalities would be expected over
time to extend to primary efferent sites (especially ventral pre-
frontal cortex) and then other efferent areas. Feedback activation
from the TPJ to primary areas (especially auditory cortex) would
also be expected to produce abnormalities in the primary regions
(e.g., Kasai et al., 2003).
The results of meta-analyses and reviews led to the hypoth-
esis that the TPJ was involved in dynamic social interaction, a
view that has been confirmed in a recent human fMRI study of
dynamic live face to face interaction within the scanner (Decety
and Lamm, 2007; Redcay, 2008; Wible et al., 2009b; Redcay et al.,
2010; Wible, 2012). This region is involved in dynamic gesture
and person perception that is multimodal (predominantly using
the auditory, visual, and tactile modalities). Auditory and visual
hallucinations of people/voices predominate in schizophrenia,
followed by tactile hallucinations. The dynamic social perception
subserved by this region is also based on the gamma synchro-
nization of more primary cortical regions. This dynamic gamma
synchronization may act as an attentional mechanism to augment
incoming information in relevant perceptual channels. This neu-
ral augmentation could also result in hallucinations because of
increased activity in primary areas (especially for auditory, visual,
and somatosensory cortices). The TPJ may serve as a convergence
point for the coordinated activation of information from sev-
eral domains in order to form the contextual gestalt perception
of socially dynamic gestures and speech. The dominant role of
the TPJ in narrative comprehension and working memory sup-
ports the view that one aspect of the functionality of this region is
in the automatic coordination of the activation/retrieval of dis-
tributed cortical modules and the coordination of information
used to support perception and action under complex natural-
istic conditions. Consistent with this supposition is the fact that
posterior parietal damage (the posterior portion of the inferior
parietal lobe) can cause the breakdown of the normally automatic
perception of simultaneous perceptual attributes (Coslett and Lie,
2008).
Since neural activity in this region corresponds to social
perception and joint attention, then over-activation of this
region could result in the erroneous perception of being within
a dynamic social situation and would be predicted to have
widespread consequences for many domains including social
perception, reactivity, and attention. Over-activation of this sys-
tem could cause phenomenon from the conscious perception of
dynamic social percepts or entities (persons), scenes, or audiovi-
sual speech representations (voices) to the unconscious feeling of
being watched or of being in the center of a social situation (repre-
sentations of eye gaze, social attention). Inherent in the perceptual
processing of dynamic gestures is a tuning or coding of social
prediction. The processing of gestalt or more integrative or con-
textual aspects of reality would be expected to break down. The
breakdown of predictive coding would result in slowing or abnor-
mal expectation, perception, and reaction within social contexts.
It might also interfere with keeping track of other’s (or self)
actions. Information about agency and intention is also inher-
ent in the code that underlies the perception of dynamic gestures.
Abnormal activation of dynamic gesture representations would
also produce an automatic or obligatory accompanying percep-
tion of agency and intention. Symptoms such as persecutory
delusions and delusions of jealousy may be reframed as hallu-
cinations of agency and intention. The over-activation of PSTS
and inferior parietal regions would be expected to cause abnor-
mal activation of saliency maps in the intraparietal sulcus leading
to abnormal saliency detection. The overlap between represen-
tational systems and regions that are used in the perception of
the self and in the perception of the social other allows us to
infer that abnormal activity related to dynamic gesture perception
would impact the self-representation and result in disturbances of
self-perception (e.g., somatic hallucinations, somatic delusions,
delusions of grandeur, delusions of control). Abnormal activa-
tion of the neural elements that are used in self representation
can also produce the sense of a presence of another or others (due
to a form of heautoscopy). This sensation could underlie many
of the symptoms (e.g., delusions of reference; delusions of per-
secution) and would also interfere with agency judgments. The
overlap between agency processing and dynamic gesture percep-
tion allows us to infer that abnormal activity related to dynamic
gesture perception would impact agency processing and could
also result in the misattribution of agency (e.g., delusions of
control, thought broadcasting, thought insertion). Although the
multimodal representations in the STS of monkey and humans
are used in gesture perception, the neurons in this region are
biased to detect threat. The detection of threat may be linked in
evolution to reproductive competitiveness as mate competition
would be a significant source of social threat. This might explain
the empirical findings that in humans and monkeys this gesture
perception system is tuned to detect threat as well as being active
under conditions of sexual competition (Perrett et al., 1985a;
Oram and Perrett, 1994; Wheaton et al., 2001; Puce and Perrett,
2003; Rilling et al., 2004; Takahashi et al., 2006). Over-activation
of these representations would be expected to result in a bias for
perceiving social threat and reproductive competition resulting in
negative perceptual biases (e.g., delusions of persecution and jeal-
ousy; delusions of reference). Affect perception involves dynamic
gestures of the face and body. Human lesion studies have shown
that the recognition of affect from faces and prosody depends on
inferior parietal (supramarginal), superior temporal, somatosen-
sory, and motor regions that are used to produce emotional and
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prosodic reactions. Hence, abnormal activity in the system for
perceiving dynamic gestures would be expected to interfere with
emotional reactivity in the face and voice resulting in flat affect
and unreactivity/affective nonresponsiveness or abnormal reac-
tivity. The TPJ/PSTS also plays a primary role in the perception of
gaze and joint attention; abnormal activity could result in several
symptoms (e.g., attention deficits, facial unreactivity, and delu-
sions of reference—feeling of being watched). The dominant role
of the (right) TPJ in theory of mind processing allows us to infer
that aberrant activation of this region would interfere with the-
ory of mind processing resulting in the abnormal perception of
intentions, abnormal social interaction and in errors of social
inference.
The framework described here provides a basis for under-
standing how specific aspects of the schizophrenic syndrome are
related. These relationships are based on representational proper-
ties that are found at the level of single unit recording in monkeys
and that are consistent with the results of lesion, brain stimu-
lation, and functional imaging studies in humans. Within this
framework, the cognitive deficiencies and positive and negative
symptoms are linked and are tied to the representational structure
and functional architecture that is evident in this posterior sys-
tem that is used in social perception and interaction. Abnormal
activity within this system would be expected to affect efferent
targets in the frontal lobe. However, it is hypothesized that the
core abnormalities stem from the over-activation or prolonged
activation of posterior regions.
EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK AND CURRENT
EVIDENCE
It is important to note that the TPJ is among the most anatomi-
cally variable regions in the human brain, and hence morphome-
tric abnormalities may be difficult to detect. Because of the role
of the TPJ in self-representation, other representation, thought
and language, functional abnormalities may also be difficult to
detect with current (subtractive) functional imaging techniques.
These functions are all present or active in the resting state. It
is hypothesized that this system should show slightly elevated
activity interposed with epochs of hyper-activation that corre-
spond to the abnormal qualia (hallucinations and delusions) and
responsive deficiencies (negative symptoms) seen in schizophre-
nia. Baseline activity, not task-related activity should be elevated.
This necessitates that task related activity in this region (which
is computed as a function of the baseline) will be affected
(decreased). Experiments using subtractive designs may subtract
out the functionality of the TPJ and hippocampus because they
are active in rest and task states. However, the data from our pre-
viously published studies show evidence for our hypotheses (e.g.,
Kubicki et al., 2003; Han et al., 2007; Hashimoto et al., 2010;Wible
et al., 2009a). The Hashimoto et al. (2010) study found that lev-
els of delusions were correlated with activity in the PSTS (not a
mid-STS region); this activity subserved rehearsal in a working
memory task. This study showed a direct link between auditory
hallucinations, delusions, and working memory activity. In addi-
tion, there have been at least six published reports showing that
TMS application to the TPJ in schizophrenic subjects reduces
schizophrenic symptoms (e.g., Lee et al., 2005; Jardri et al., 2007).
Hippocampal over-activation in schizophrenia has been found to
be independent of frontal abnormalities (Ragland et al., 2005).
A meta-analysis of schizophrenia morphometric studies showed
the most evidence for reductions in (left) superior temporal and
hippocampal regions (Honea et al., 2005; see also Gur et al.,
2000; Eliez et al., 2001). Studies using large numbers of subjects
to examine schizophrenic morphometric measures have recently
been published. One study used large numbers of schizophrenia
spectrum subjects compared to siblings and normal controls—
see Figure 11 (Honea et al., 2008). Another study combined data
from two consortiums, the FBIRN and Mind Clinical Imaging
Consortium or MCIC to examine brain volume in schizophrenic
(and schizoaffective) and control subjects—see Figure 12. These
data comprise subjects from nine sites across the country (our
laboratory also contributed data to this dataset). The TPJ, espe-
cially in the right hemisphere, was implicated in both studies
even though patients with affective components were included.
FIGURE 11 | From Honea et al. (2008) showing data from a large
morphometric study using 169 patients with schizophrenia-spectrum
disorders and 212 control subjects Statistical maps of the entire brain
showing gray matter volume reductions in schizophrenics versus
control subjects. Figure 1 panel A reprinted with permission from Honea
et al. (2008). © 2008 Society of Biological Psychiatry.
FIGURE 12 | From Segall et al. (2009) a large morphometric study of
patients with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and controls
based on data from two consortiums with sites across the country
(FBIRN and MCIC). Left panel shows right hemisphere and Right panel
shows left hemisphere. The combined FBIRN and MCIC data set consists
of 237 schizophrenic and 266 control subjects. Reprint of Figure 1, panel C
with permission from the author from Segall et al. (2009).
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Hence, the results of volume analysis of these large datasets match
the predictions put forth here [as seen in the figures throughout
the paper and in Wible et al. (2009b)] and lend support to the
current framework.
More targeted investigations of these regions using natural-
istic dynamic stimuli in functional imaging experiments should
yield insight into the function of this system in schizophrenia.
Episodic over-activation of the hippocampus and TPJ should be
associated with the onset and psychotic episodes of schizophrenia
and may even be used to predict conversion in high risk indi-
viduals. As described above, activity in affected regions would
be expected to show at least a modest increased baseline activity
even between active episodes or symptoms such as hallucina-
tions and delusions. This system is not fully understood, although
rapid progress is being made. As the components and charac-
teristics of the system become clear so should its role in pro-
ducing psychosis. The framework allows for the linking of more
molecular and genetic abnormalities (e.g., in hippocampus) to
systems level cognitive neuroscience (a domain in which symp-
toms and behavior can be understood). A framework such as
this should lead to the development of better animal models of
psychiatric disease. Elements of this framework may be applica-
ble to other diseases such as autism (tonic overactivation from the
hippocampus from an early age interfering with the formation
of self, other and language representation), PTSD (hippocam-
pus, stress, and reactivation of threatening action related per-
cepts and memories), paranoid personality disorder (a milder
form of persecutory delusions) and depression in affective psy-
chosis (symptoms similar to Cotard’s Syndrome—seeWible et al.,
2009b).
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